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IDENTIFYING FUNDAMENTAL BREACH OF 
ARTICLES 25 AND 49 OF THE CISG: THE GOOD
FAITH DUTY OF COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS 
TO CURE DEFECTS—MAKE THE PARTIES 




Article 49(1) of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (the “CISG”) allows the parties to international 
sales of goods to avoid their contracts.1 In particular, it provides that “[t]he 
buyer may declare the contract avoided: (a) if the failure by the seller to 
perform any of his obligations under the contract or this Convention 
amounts to a fundamental breach of contract.”2 The “fundamental breach” 
in this provision is defined by article 25, which provides,
A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is 
fundamental if it results in such detriment to the other party as 
substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under 
the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee and a 
reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances 
would not have foreseen such a result.3
This article addresses two daunting problems with this provision. The 
first problem lies in the “unless” clause of the latter part of the provision. 
The clause, which lays down a criterion referred to as the “foreseeability 
* Professor of Law, Himeji-Dokkyo University, Japan. LLM, Kyoto University 
(1989). The author is profoundly indebted to late Professor Shinichiro Michida, Rapporteur of 
the CISG at the Diplomatic Conference in Vienna in 1980, Adjunct Professor at University of 
Michigan Law School, 1966. I also thank the editors of the Michigan Journal of International 
Law for their valuable help and comments. I especially owe much to Ms. Lindsay Bernsen 
Wardlaw, Editor-in-Chief. Her insightful suggestions greatly enhanced this article by making 
it logically consistent in every aspect and by refining my English.
1. UN Convention on Contracts for the Int’l Sale of Goods, art. 49(1), Apr. 11, 1980, 
1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG]. Applicability of the Convention is determined by article 
1, which provides: “(1) This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties 
whose places of business are in different States: (a) when the States are Contracting States; or 
(b) when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a
Contracting State.”
2. Id. (emphasis added).
3. Id. art. 25 (emphasis added).
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test” in this article, downgrades a fundamental breach to a non-fundamental 
one if the breaching party did not foresee, and if a reasonable person would 
not have foreseen, the substantial detriment.4 As we will see in Part II, the 
role of the foreseeability test is very limited, partly because the phrase 
“what he is entitled to expect” in the former part of article 25 can perform a 
function comparable to the foreseeability test, and partly because it is 
questionable whether there is ever a real case in which a reasonable person 
could not foresee any results of a breach so devastating that they would 
substantially frustrate the buyer’s expectations.
In addition to its limited applicability, the foreseeability test has an 
intrinsic irrationality in linking unforeseeability to non-avoidance of 
contract. That is, under the foreseeability test, the aggrieved party cannot 
avoid the contract and must pay for the goods even if the goods are 
irreparably defective, so long as that result was unforeseeable to the 
breaching party. In sum, the foreseeability test is actually based on the 
notion of culpability––or the lack of it––on the part of the breaching party. 
This, however, is irrational: At the time of concluding the contract, 
reasonable merchants would tacitly assume that the contract should be 
avoided in such a situation. For these reasons, the foreseeability test both 
can and should be nullified: The nullification is no big deal for the CISG 
jurisprudence because the applicability of the test is very limited.
The second daunting problem in article 25 is how “substantially
deprived” the buyer must be of “what he is entitled to expect under the 
contract” for the seller’s breach to become fundamental. As one 
commentary aptly points out, “[d]efining fundamental by substantial . . .
leaves an impression of playful tautology.”5 For example, it is probably 
clear that a seller delivering junk parts to a buyer, instead of the machine the 
buyer has contracted for, has substantially deprived the buyer of what he is 
entitled to expect under the contract, giving rise to a fundamental breach. 
However, matters are not always that simple. We do not have an appropriate 
criterion as to the level or magnitude required for substantial deprivation of 
the legitimate expectations6 of the buyer. Whether a breach results in 
substantial detriment depends on each party’s expectations, along with 
numerous factors such as the kind and amount of the goods, purpose of the 
contract, and other circumstances peculiar to the transaction in question.7 It 
4. In this article, the phrase “substantial detriment” is used as a short form for article 
25’s language, “such detriment . . . as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to 
expect under the contract.”
5. Michael Will, Article 25, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW:
THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 205, 212 (Cesare Massimo Bianca et al. eds., 1987) 
[hereinafter VIENNA COMMENTARY] (emphasis added).
6. In this article, the article 25 language “what he is entitled to expect under the 
contract” is referred to as a party’s “legitimate expectations.”
7. See BRUNO ZELLER, DAMAGES UNDER THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INT’L SALE OF GOODS, ¶13.29 (3d ed. 2018) (“The word ‘detriment’ cannot be uniformly 
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also turns on many aleatory factors, such as the gravity of the defects, 
curability of defects, time and cost needed for cure,8 and the willingness of 
parties to cure. It seems next to impossible to formulate a criterion which 
embraces all of these elements and combines them.
By applying article 7(1)’s good faith requirement to other provisions of 
the CISG relating to remedy, this article attempts to provide parties and 
judges with an alternative solution for determining the existence of a 
fundamental breach. Essentially, this article argues, a fundamental breach 
occurs when the parties’ own attempts to cure have fallen short of the 
parties’ obligations of good faith. This test both requires, and emphasizes 
the importance of, nullifying the foreseeability test: While parties can 
control and foresee their good faith efforts to cure, failed attempts to cure 
are often unforeseeable. It is unfair that the foreseeability test prevents the 
contract from being avoided in these situations, leaving fatally irreparable 
goods in the hands of the buyer, who is not relieved of his obligation to pay.
In summary, this article answers the question of how to determine the 
existence of a fundamental breach under article 25 that will enable 
avoidance under article 49. It does so in two broad stages: First, it explains 
that the second half of article 25 (the “foreseeability test”) should receive 
lessened attention in this inquiry or should be rejected entirely. Second, it 
returns to the first half of article 25, which contains the article’s affirmative 
elements, homing in on the element of substantial deprivation. The word 
“substantial” is subjective, and courts have struggled with its definition. 
This article therefore proposes to define the substantiality of a detriment 
through the existence of the parties’ good faith efforts to remedy the 
detriment.
Part II critically examines the role of the “foreseeability test” and finds 
that it is not a necessary component of article 25’s definition of a 
fundamental breach. In Section A, this article concludes that the 
“foreseeability test” exists as a proxy for the breaching party’s culpability. It 
also points out the intrinsic irrationality of the foreseeability test, which 
links unforeseeability to non-avoidance. Section B demonstrates that a 
different article 25 phrase, “what he is entitled to expect,” can 
independently perform a comparable function by screening out avoidances 
premised on the injured party’s illegitimate expectations. Section C argues 
that, in any event, there are not many cases in which a reasonable merchant 
could not foresee that his action would constitute the kind of deprivation 
that would substantially frustrate the buyer’s expectations.
Part III explores when the seller must foresee substantial detriment 
under the foreseeability test. In Section A, two opposing views are 
defined, as it depends on each party’s expectations of his entitlement under the contract. . . . It 
takes on substance within a particular context only, that is, within a contract.”).
8. In this article, the words “cure” and “remedy” mean to remove or ameliorate the 
defects or other non-conformities of goods by such measures as repair and substitution. They 
are also used as nouns of comparable meaning.
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examined: one fixing the time of foreseeability at the time of conclusion of 
contract, and the other shifting the time of foreseeability to a later event. 
Section B concludes that reasonable merchants will have a shared tacit 
assumption at the time of concluding the contract that their contract should 
be avoided if a breach unforeseeably causes substantial detriment.
Part IV, by analyzing court decisions, shows that we lack any other 
appropriate criterion to identify a fundamental breach. It also shows that 
substantial detriment can be measured by availability of remedy.
Part V continues to evaluate substantial detriment through the lens of 
remedy, considering the case of easily obtainable, resalable, or repairable 
goods and the case of irreparably defective goods. In the former case, due to 
ease of remedy, a fundamental breach is relatively easily denied, and in the 
latter, due to the difficulty—or impossibility—of remedy it is relatively 
easily found.
In Part VI, focusing on cases which do not fall in either category 
discussed in Part V, the article argues that the good faith principle provided 
in CISG article 7(1) obliges the seller to offer to cure the goods’ defects, 
and, conversely, it obliges the buyer to require the seller to do the same. 
Section A criticizes the view that a curable defect of the goods does not in 
itself amount to a fundamental breach, if there is the possibility that the 
seller may cure. Section B examines the buyer’s right to require the seller to 
repair. Notably, article 46(3) provides that the buyer may require the seller 
to remedy the lack of conformity by repair but does not explicitly oblige the 
buyer to do so. Nevertheless, Section C advocates that the buyer is obliged
to require the seller to repair defects by the application of article 7(1)’s good 
faith requirement. Section D argues that the good faith principle also obliges 
the buyer to require the seller to substitute the defective goods. Finally, 
Section E examines the seller’s right to remedy his failure, provided in 
article 48(1), and shows that the good faith requirement obliges the seller to 
offer remedy. In the course of this reasoning, this paper settles the paradox 
of the article 48(1)’s cross-reference to article 49 (“Subject to Article 49”), 
one of the most controversial in international sales law.
Part VII synthesizes this analysis. It advocates that the seller and the 
buyer must, in collaboration, make bona fide efforts to cure any defects, and 
that the outcome of those attempts will decide whether the breach involved 
amounts to a fundamental breach, dispensing with the need for an abstract 
tautological criterion, like the foreseeability test.
II.  The Questionable Role of the Foreseeability Test
As introduced above, article 25 of the CISG defines a “fundamental 
breach”—one that allows a buyer to avoid a contract under article 49(1) —
as a breach that
results in such detriment to the other party as substantially to 
deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract, 
Spring 2020] Identifying Fundamental Breach 67
unless the party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person 
of the same kind in the same circumstances would not have 
foreseen such a result.9
Critically, this provision releases the seller from the disadvantages resulting 
from the buyer’s avoidance on two conditions: (1) The seller himself did not 
foresee the substantial detriment, and (2) a reasonable person of the same 
kind in the same circumstances would not have foreseen the substantial 
detriment. This author collectively refers to these criteria, found in the 
“unless” clause, as the “foreseeability test.”
In this part, the article demonstrates that the role of the foreseeability 
test  is very limited, partly because the “legitimate expectations” 
requirement is an independent qualifier on fundamental breach (separate 
from the foreseeability test, which functions as an escape hatch for sellers 
when substantial detriment and legitimate expectations are present), and it 
screens out those expectations of the aggrieved party which are 
unforeseeable for the breaching party. And partly because a reasonable 
person would usually foresee the substantial deprivation of a legitimate
expectation.
These propositions nullify the foreseeability test, advocating its intrinsic 
irrationality. They also support the premise that this nullification will not 
have a significant implication for the CISG jurisprudence because cases that 
deny avoidance for the reason of unforeseeability are very rare. As later 
parts will discuss, the better reading of article 25 is that the outcome of bona 
fide efforts to attempt to cure should decide the fundamentality of the 
breach. Yet, if we attempt to add a good faith attempt to remedy to our 
article 25 analysis without nullifying the foreseeability test, we hit a 
paradox: Failures to cure are often unforeseeable, but being unforeseeable 
prevents the contract from being avoided! This result is irrational, leaving
the fatally defective goods in the hands of the buyer, who must pay for 
them.
A. The Notion of Culpability in the Foreseeability Test
Why do we care about foreseeability? One possible interpretation of the 
foreseeability test is that it describes the extent to which society is willing to 
assign culpability (blameworthiness) to the breaching party. That is to say, 
the breaching party is not liable or culpable (and hence the breach is not 
egregious or “fundamental”) where the breaching party “did not foresee” 
substantial detriment to the other party. Put in the terminology of criminal 
law, the breaching party did not have mens rea in bringing about such 
serious results from his breach. If asked, he would say, “Little did I dream 
of my breach causing such a ruinous situation.”  In such a situation, article 
9. CISG, supra note 1, art. 25 (emphasis added).
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25 exonerates the breaching party from culpability, and, accordingly, from 
the hardship he would suffer if the injured party avoided the contract.
In contrast, the breaching party is culpable—and hence the breach is 
fundamental—if the breaching party foresaw the injured party’s substantial 
detriment because in that case the breaching party did have mens rea. The 
breaching party, if explaining the situation candidly, would say, “I knew 
well my breach would produce such a ruinous situation, and I dared do it.”
The drafting history of article 25 buttresses its interpretation as an 
article determined by culpability. In 1976, the seventh session of the 
Working Group of the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (“UNCITRAL”) made the following draft of the article: “A breach 
committed by one of the parties to the contract is fundamental if it results in 
substantial detriment to the other party and the party in breach foresaw or 
had reason to foresee such a result.”10 Read carefully, this language put the 
burden of proof on the claimant (the aggrieved party) to show that the 
breaching party foresaw or had reason to foresee the resulting detriment, 
rather than on the breaching party to show that it did not foresee the same. 
In UNCITRAL’s 1977 Session, a delegate of the Philippines, criticizing the 
draft, stated:
Under the provisions of the article as it stood, it would be necessary 
for the party in breach to foresee the result before a breach 
committed became a “fundamental breach.” That was something 
that would be extremely difficult to prove in court and it seemed 
most unfair that the guilty party should be able to throw the burden 
of proof on to the aggrieved party.11
Following this criticism, article 25 was given its “unless” clause to 
move the burden of proving (un)foreseeability to the “guilty” party—
namely, the party who has committed a fundamental breach.12 It was thereby 
settled that the breaching party is not responsible for the unforeseeable 
consequences of his breach.13
The underlying problem with this approach is the irrational fiat of the 
“unless” clause which links unforeseeability with unavoidability, based on 
10. See Shinichiro Michida, Cancellation of Contracts, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 279, 282 
(1979); see also U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [“UNCITRAL”], Yearbook Volume VII: 
1976, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1976, at 90, art. 8 (1977).
11. See Michida, supra note 10, at 285 (emphasis added); see also UNCITRAL, 
Yearbook Volume VIII: 1977, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1977, art. 9 (1978).
12. See Ulrich G. Schroeter, Article 25, in PETER SCHLECHTRIEM & INGEBORG 
SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF 
GOODS (CISG) 416, 419, ¶ 5 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 4th ed. 2016) [hereinafter 
SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER] (“It was only logical that, following a proposal by the 
Philippines, an attempt was made to clarify the exceptional nature of that exoneration by 
including the wording ‘unless . . .’: Material loss which the promisor did not foresee and could 
not have foreseen should not be his responsibility.”).
13. Id.
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the notion of culpability.14 Even when comparing otherwise identical 
substantial detriments arising from a serious breach, the breaching party is 
not culpable, and hence the breach is not fundamental, if the breaching party 
did not foresee, or a reasonable person would not have foreseen, such a 
result. If he foresaw or a reasonable person would have foreseen such a 
result, the same breach is upgraded to a fundamental one. But that does not 
make sense: Something that “results in such detriment to the other party as 
substantially to deprive him of”15 his legitimate expectations will be 
something that results in that detriment, regardless of whether it is 
foreseeable or not. A grave detriment is a grave detriment after all, 
regardless of its foreseeability. This illogicality produces a similarly 
illogical outcome: Even though the non-breaching party is substantially 
deprived of his legitimate expectations, he cannot avoid the demolished 
contract when the detriment is not foreseeable. Must a buyer pay for junk?
B. Restrictions on the Type or Content of Expectations by Legitimacy
This section deals with the type or content of the injured party’s 
expectations regarding its counterparty’s performance of contract, setting 
aside for a while the issue of the substantiality of the deprivation which will 
be discussed in the next section.  As we have seen in the last section, the 
foreseeability test is based on the notion of the culpability of the breaching 
party. Consequently, concerning the type or content of the injured party’s 
expectations, the nub of the notion is that it is unjust for a breaching party to
be forced to endure the hardship of the injured party’s avoidance when he 
did not foresee, and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same 
circumstances would not have foreseen, that the injured party would have a 
certain type of expectation from the contract and that this expectation would 
be frustrated by the breach.
“[A] reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances” is 
construed to be “a reasonable merchant” in the same circumstances. 
“Ordinarily this will mean merchants with a reasonable degree of 
14. There is another argument against avoidance in unforeseeable situations: It would 
be anomalous for article 49 to grant the remedy of avoidance for the unforeseeable 
consequences of a breach, while damages are not granted for them by article 74, which 
provides that “damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to 
have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract.” In other words, it would be 
incongruous “if a party could take the radical step of avoiding the contract on the basis of 
consequences for which it could not even recover damages.” Robert Koch, The Concept of 
Fundamental Breach of Contract Under the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the Int’l Sale 
of Goods (CISG), in 1998 REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 177, 322 (Pace International Law Review ed. 1999). The 
unavailability of damage claims for unforeseeable loss has more affinity with avoidance than 
maintenance of contract, because the unavailability of damage claims and avoidance 
commonly treat unforeseeable situations as belonging to the exterritorial sphere of contract 
where the parties are released from their contractual obligations.
15. CISG, supra note 1, art. 25.
70 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 41:63
knowledge and experience in their trade, including knowledge of the 
relevant market conditions, whether regional or global.”16 Where even such 
a knowledgeable merchant would not have foreseen the result of a breach, 
the breaching party has a good reason to resist avoidance by the other party. 
For him, avoidance is “a bolt from the blue” and he might say, “Little did I 
dream that you would have such expectations.”
Article 25 provides a safeguard against this bolt from the blue through 
what this author calls the “legitimate expectation test.” This test restricts 
avoidance to situations where the injured party’s expectations do not exceed 
“what [that party] is entitled to expect under the contract.” Notably, article 
25 does not say “what [the injured party] expects under the contract.”17
What a party is entitled to expect under the contract is different from what it 
does expect under the contract.
For example, Seller S concluded a contract with Buyer B over the 
phone to sell B 15 units of computer parts. B unjustifiably had a 
misconception that the amount was 50 units. (The confirmation fax sent by 
S after the phone call clearly indicated “15 units,” but B overlooked it.) S 
delivered 15 units to B. B found that all 15 units were seriously defective. B 
refused to pay, avoiding the contract. B’s avoidance is justified on the basis 
that all of the delivered units were seriously defective but not because he 
was “entitled to expect” 50 units (as he subjectively expected) instead of 15 
units.18 (Had all 15 units been without defect, B’s avoidance would not be 
justified.)
The injured party’s legitimate expectations should be determined 
primarily by what the parties have explicitly or impliedly agreed in the 
contract.19 Determination of the content of the contract, and hence 
16. Andrea Björklund, Article 25, in UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG): A COMMENTARY 337, 344, ¶ 22 (Stefan Kröll et al. 
eds., 2 ed. 2018) [hereinafter UN COMMENTARY]; see also Andrew Babiak, Defining 
Fundamental Breach Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, 6 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 113 at 122 (1992) (“Since parties to contracts 
involving international sales are presumed to be merchants, a ‘reasonable person’ may be 
construed as a reasonable merchant. A reasonable merchant would, therefore, encompass all 
merchants that satisfy the standards of their trade and that are not intellectually or 
professionally substandard. The phrase ‘of the same kind’ refers to a merchant in the same 
business, doing the same functions or operations as the party in breach. The requirement that 
the reasonable merchant be ‘in the same circumstances’ refers to the market conditions, both 
regional and world-wide.”).
17. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 25.
18. An ad hoc working group on First Committee Deliberations at the 1980 Vienna 
Diplomatic Conference proposed that a breach is “fundamental” “if it results in such detriment 
to the other party as will substantially impair his expectations under the contract.” In a twenty-
two to eighteen vote, the majority of delegations agreed to this definition, with three of them 
explicitly noting that the reference to a party’s expectations under the contract added an 
additional element of objectivity to the definition. See JOHN O. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES 550–51 (1989).
19. See Koch, supra note 14, at 262–63.
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demarcation of a party’s legitimate expectations, is primarily a matter of 
contract interpretation. Therefore, it is subject to the general interpretive 
rules of the CISG provided in article 8:20
(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and 
other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to his 
intent where the other party knew or could not have been 
unaware what that intent was.
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by 
and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to 
the understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as 
the other party would have had in the same circumstances.21
Paragraph (1) provides that a party’s subjective intent prevails “where 
the other party knew or could not have been unaware” of it. For example, a 
buyer has long ordered from a seller 1,000 units of certain goods every 
month. One month, the buyer’s fax order form showed 10,000 units instead 
of 1,000 units. Having received no notice of change, the seller assumed it 
was a simple error and that the buyer’s intent was to buy 1,000 units as 
usual. Under paragraph (1), this was appropriate: The seller knew of the 
buyer’s intent, or at least could have been unaware of any changes in the 
buyer’s intent.
Paragraph (2) provides that, when paragraph (1) does not apply, “the 
understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind” prevails. In the 
above example, if the buyer and seller had no long-term relationship, then 
the seller would be in no position to infer the real intent of the buyer. and a 
reasonable person of the same kind as S would understand that the amount 
of the ordered units was 10,000, as shown in the order form.
To clarify how article 8 works to determine whether a party “is entitled 
to expect under the contract” a certain interest, consider the following 
example:
Seller S, engaged in producing and selling machine parts, concluded a 
sales contract with Buyer B, an interior construction company, for 500 
golden gears of certain types and sizes. After delivery, B found all the 500 
gears had slight stains on their surface which lessened their gloss. The stains 
were unremovable but had no adverse effects if they were used as parts of 
machines. However, B intended to use them as parts of an artistic decoration 
20. See PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 178, art. 25 (Peter Schlechtriem ed. 1998) (“When 
interpreting the contract, knowledge or foreseeability of the promisee’s expectations would 
have to be taken into account also under Article 8(1) and (2).”); see also ZELLER, supra note 
7, ¶13.27 (“Article 25 also includes a proviso, namely foresee-ability and knowledge that a 
breach would result in substantially depriving the other party ‘of what he is entitled to expect’.
The expectations of the promise would have to be taken into account under Article 8(1) and 
(2).”).
21. CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(1)–(2).
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exhibited in the entrance hall of a department store which had hired B for 
the construction. B, simply filling out the order form on S’s website, did not 
inform S of this special usage and that the luster of the gears was very 
important for B. B considered the stains on the gears to be a fundamental 
breach and declared the contract avoided. S did not know the importance of 
the shininess of the gears.
In this example, one of the possible issues is whether B “is entitled to 
expect under the contract” that the gears are free of stains and shiny enough 
to be used for decoration. Applying article 8, B is not entitled to expect it. 
According to paragraph (1), B’s intent to have gears shiny enough for 
decoration is acknowledged in the interpretation of the contract only “where 
the other party knew or could not have been unaware” of it. However, S did 
not know B’s intent in the hypothetical situation posed above.  Also, S 
could have been unaware of B’s intent because S simply received B’s order 
by website among many other orders for parts of machines.
Separately, according to paragraph (2), B’s intent may be 
acknowledged when it accords with “the understanding that a reasonable 
person of the same kind as the other party would have had in the same 
circumstances.” However, a reasonable person of the same kind as S would 
not have the understanding that B would use the gears for decoration, given 
that S only received B’s order through the website without any notice of its 
special purpose.
The above reasoning establishes that the phrase “is entitled to expect” 
imposes an objective restriction on the type or content of the buyer’s 
expectations, the substantial deprivation of which may be considered a 
fundamental breach. The phrase “is entitled to” manifestly limits 
expectations to those objectively ascertainable or foreseeable ones. Even if a 
non-breaching party was substantially deprived of some benefit that he tried 
to obtain, so long as he was not “entitled to expect” it, it is a matter outside 
of the ambit of article 25.
When a buyer’s expectations are illegitimate, we need not go on to 
inquire whether the deprivation of those expectations was foreseeable or 
not; it cannot form a basis of a fundamental breach. Thus, the foreseeability 
test—used to absolve sellers of liability where they lack the requisite mens 
rea to substantially deprive the buyer of the buyer’s legitimate 
expectations—is not necessary to excuse sellers when they could not have 
expected that their own behavior would constitute a breach.  Instead, the 
requirement of “is entitled to expect” can independently and affirmatively 
screen out buyers’ illegitimate expectations.22 What is left on the sieve
cannot be a “bolt from the blue” for sellers. The breaching party can seldom 
22. See Schroeter, supra note 12, at 420, ¶5 (“During the Vienna Diplomatic 
Conference, it was subsequently not fully realized that by reducing the importance accorded to 
‘substantial detriment’ in favour of determining detriment by reference to what the 
promise . . . expected from the contract, ‘foreseeability’ had thereby lost its function as a 
ground for excuse where loss was unforeseeable.”).
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have an opportunity to say, “I never foresaw that my breach would deprive 
my counterparty of its illegitimate expectation,” because the counterparty is 
not entitled to hold such an expectation in the first place, and therefore 
cannot claim on it. The following observation is pertinent to this conclusion:
unforeseeability can be successfully invoked only when the 
aggrieved party’s special interest in the performance of the violated 
duty does not follow from the terms of the contract or from the 
negotiations between the parties prior to the[ir] conclusion. In most 
of the reported cases in which the courts found [a] fundamental 
breach, however, the aggrieved party’s special interest was obvious 
from the terms of the contract, or the aggrieved party was able to 
prove that it had made clear its special interest during the contract 
negotiations.23
Essentially, in the very circumstances where the drafters of the 
foreseeability test appeared worried that article 25 might be used to graft 
liability onto unsuspecting sellers (when a buyer wanted something from its 
purchase that the seller could not have predicted), article 25’s “legitimate 
expectations” test is independently sufficient to protect sellers.
C. Requirement of Substantiality
The last section showed that the foreseeability test is unnecessary to 
limit the type or content of the interest an injured party may expect from a 
contract because the “entitled to expect” test performs a comparable 
function. It also pointed out that in most cases parties are entitled to the 
benefit of the bargain (or “special interest”) they expected. Cases are rare in 
which both (1) parties are not entitled to their interest and (2) the  
deprivation of that interest is unforeseeable. Therefore, the foreseeability 
test, when applied to the type of expectation, plays a limited analytic role.
Yet, the foreseeability test may still have another culpability-gauging 
function, i.e., limiting the type of the deprivation itself by imposing a
criterion of substantiality on claims of fundamental breach. Beyond limiting 
expectations to those of a foreseeable type or content, the foreseeability test 
can be construed to impose the requirement that the magnitude, or the 
substantiality, of a deprivation be foreseeable (e.g., by setting the amount or
proportion of defective goods required). From this perspective, the test 
commands inquiry into whether a breaching party did not foresee, or a 
reasonable person would not have foreseen, that the injured party’s (1) 
deprivation of (2) legitimate expectations would be (3) substantial. Where a 
buyer’s expectations are given to be legitimate, a breaching party may say, 
“Little did I know how much my breach subverted your expectations.”
Where such a breach is “substantial,” the foreseeability test prevents the 
aggrieved party from avoiding the contract.
23. Koch, supra note 14, at 258.  
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Let us consider the following example:
The seller, a trading company of agricultural products, agreed to 
ship 5,000 bushels of grade no. 1 corn to the buyer, a producer of 
cornflakes. But the seller actually delivered 5,000 bushels of grade 
no. 2 corn. The corn of that grade is of no use for production by the 
buyer. The seller offered to redeliver grade no.1 corn to the buyer 
within a month. The buyer refused this offer because it would 
materially delay its production schedule and avoided the contract.
In this example, it goes without saying that the buyer was deprived of 
its legitimate expectations, i.e., a timely delivery of 5,000 bushels of grade 
no. 1 corn and the profit arising from the production of cornflakes by using 
it. Further, because the whole order of corn delivered was unusable, there is 
no doubt that the deprivation was substantial. Likewise, the seller is a 
trading company of agricultural products, and therefore it is inconceivable 
that he “did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in the 
same circumstances would not have foreseen” such a result.24 It would be 
hard to imagine that an expert merchant is ignorant of the fact that certain 
product defects may substantially deprive the other party of what he can 
legitimately expect. Rather, the more substantial the deprivation is, the less 
likely it is that “merchants with a reasonable degree of knowledge and 
experience in their trade”25 would fail to foresee it.
In my analysis, the instances in which the foreseeability test will be 
used to determine the substantiality of a deprivation are limited, and the
instances in which it will weed out claims not already screened by the 
legitimate expectations test are fewer still. Consider: The inquiry of 
substantiality is necessary only for those kinds of expectations which have 
been sifted through the legitimate expectations test. On the sifter are left 
only those expectations which are reasonably cognizable. Accordingly, at 
this stage, there seem to be few cases where a reasonable merchant fails to 
foresee that the deprivation of legitimate expectations would be 
substantial.26 Again, then, the foreseeability test has little to add over 
affirmative requirements of article 25 in the legitimate expectations and 
substantial deprivation tests.
24. CISG, supra note 1 art. 25. 
25. Björklund, supra note 16, at 344.
26. Nonetheless, one such example is given in Part III.A: Essentially, when seller acts 
on background norms and customs of an industry that suggest certain literal terms of the 
contract may be breached without consequence or at a slight price accommodation, if this 
does not match the buyer’s particular expectations that the term be met exactly as written.
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III.  The Time of Foreseeability and Parties’ Shared 
Tacit Assumptions
A. Time of Foreseeability
There is one major, persistent problem with the foreseeability test (even 
when deployed in the limited form discussed above to evaluate 
substantiality): The time when foresight is required, i.e., when the breaching 
party must foresee the result of his breach, is ambiguous.  There are two 
opposing views—one fixing the “time of foreseeability” at the time of 
conclusion of contract, and the other taking account of later events. Insisting 
that the time of foreseeability should be fixed at the time of the conclusion 
of contract, Professor Schlechtriem expounds on his theory of foreseeability 
as a substitute for certain contractual terms as follows:
In the author’s opinion, the role which foreseeability plays . . .
makes it clear that it is the time when the contract was concluded 
that is decisive. The promisor’s knowledge or the foreseeability of 
the promisee’s interest in individual contractual obligations and 
methods of performance can be a ‘substitute’ for the need to reach 
clear agreement in the contract on the importance of those matters, 
i.e. it can make an appropriate interpretation of the contract 
possible. However, the importance attached by a promisee to a 
particular obligation, which has been shown otherwise than by 
express agreement, must nevertheless be fixed by the time the 
contract is concluded. If knowledge or foreseeability is to be 
equivalent to express agreement, it must in any event exist at the 
time when the contract was concluded.27
In his theory, foreseeability must be a part of the contract or a substitute 
for contractual terms. Therefore, whether the seller foresaw, or a reasonable 
person would have foreseen, substantial detriment must be determined by 
either the presence of an express contractual agreement or by inferring the 
seller’s mental state at the time of the conclusion of the contract.
On the other hand, Professor Honnold argues that information acquired 
after the conclusion of the contract is relevant to or even decisive of 
foreseeability. He illustrates this through a hypothetical shipment of rice 
bags:
S agreed to ship 100 bags of rice to B. B’s order was on a printed 
form that specified “new bags.” When S prepared to ship, he had at 
hand sound, used bags that he believed were of the same quality as 
27. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 20, at 180. See also Ulrich Magnus, Beyond the Digest: 
Part III (Articles 25–34, 45–52), in THE DRAFT UNCITRAL DIGEST & BEYOND: CASES,
ANALYSIS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE U.N. SALES CONVENTION 319, 324 (Ronald 
Brand et al. eds., 2004). 
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new bags and would be acceptable to B subject to a modest price 
allowance. However, before S bagged the rice, B telexed S, “Have 
obtained contract for resale of rice which emphasizes use of new 
bags. Although sound used bags would usually be acceptable 
subject to a price allowance, use of new bags for this shipment is 
very important.” S replied, “Shipping in extra high-quality used 
bags.” B rejected the shipment and notified S that the contract was 
avoided because of the danger of rejection by the sub-purchaser.28
The gist of this example is that while S could not foresee a substantial 
deprivation of B’s expectations at the time the parties concluded the 
contract, substantial deprivation became foreseeable after B informed S of 
the resale contract which emphasized new bags. In this example, Professor
Honnold demonstrates that the time of foreseeability provided in article 25 
can shift from the time of the conclusion of the contract to the time of the 
telex. According to his view, S could foresee, at the time of the shipment,
the substantial deprivation of B’s legitimate expectations. Hence, S’s choice 
to ship the rice in used bags qualifies as a fundamental breach.
Respectfully, this example is flawed. The example makes clear that at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract, the parties had a custom to treat 
“sound used bags” as “new bags” with a price allowance.29 The telex sent by 
B clearly indicates that they had customarily accepted sound used bags as 
new bags. This interpretation of the word “new” is not objective, but 
according to CISG article 8(1), the subjective usage shared by both parties 
prevails over otherwise objective usages.30 Therefore, there was no breach 
of the contract, even if S sent the rice in used bags. Because it was a part of 
their contract that, subject to a price allowance, sound used bags were 
acceptable for B, S’s choice to ship in sound used bags never 
“substantially. . .deprive[d] [B] of what he [was] entitled to expect under the 
contract.”31
Instead, Professor Honnold’s example illustrates an offer to modify the 
contract: B’s telex was an offer to modify the parties’ mutual agreement as 
to the quality of bags. S rejected this offer, by replying, “Shipping in extra 
high-quality used bags.” B’s offer to modify the contract failed, and both 
parties remained bound to their original contract. B could neither reject S’s 
delivery, nor avoid the contract.32
28. JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 
1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 276 (Harry M. Flechtner ed., 4th ed. 2009). 
29. CISG, supra note 1, art. 9(1) (“The parties are bound by any usage to which they 
have agreed and by any practices which they have established between themselves.”).
30. CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(1) (“[S]tatements made by and other conduct of a party 
are to be interpreted according to his intent where the other party knew or could not have been 
unaware what that intent was.”).
31. CISG, supra note 1, art. 25.
32. One commentator presents a similar hypothetical, suggesting that information 
exchanged by the parties after the conclusion of the contract is relevant to their legitimate 
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Yet, Professor Honnold has a point. Let us consider another version of 
Professor Honnold’s hypothetical by deleting B’s telexed concession 
(“[a]lthough sound used bags would usually be acceptable subject to a price 
allowance”) to S. In this version, there is no such custom between the 
parties as described in Honnold’s original hypothetical. This deletion 
changes the story. At the time of the conclusion of the contract, B meant 
literally new bags, while S plotted to send the rice in sound used bags, 
subjectively thinking that this would be acceptable for B. Notice that in this 
amended example, S intended to breach the contract, but thought that his 
breach would be a minor one remedied by a price allowance. In other 
words, he did not foresee that his breach would result in substantial 
detriment to B. This situation was changed by B’s telex to S (“Have 
obtained contract for resale of rice which emphasizes use of new bags. Use 
of new bags for this shipment is very important.”) At this point, it became 
foreseeable to S that his breach would substantially deprive B of his 
legitimate expectations. Nevertheless, S replied, “Shipping in extra high-
quality used bags.” B rejected the shipment and notified S that he was 
avoiding the contract because of the danger of rejection by the sub-
purchaser. Professor Honnold’s conclusion becomes pertinent in this 
modified hypothetical:
[T]he information the seller received subsequent to the contract but 
before shipment gave the seller reason to foresee that the breach of 
contract would ‘substantially’ deprive the buyer of what he was 
entitled to expect under the contract, and that the buyer’s avoidance 
was justified under articles 25 and 49(1)(a).33
Here, according to Professor Honnold’s view, the time of foreseeability 
does shift from the time of conclusion of the contract to the time of B’s 
telex. Knowledge or information obtained after the conclusion of contract 
may therefore be relevant to determine foreseeability.
expectations. See Koch, supra note 14, at 321 (The buyer “could transform a contract, in 
which the time of delivery is not fundamental, into a transaction where time is of the essence 
of the contract by simply informing the seller that he has promised to sell the goods at a 
particular time.”). This illustration also involves a unilateral offer to modify an explicit or 
implied contract term as to the date of delivery, and the seller is not bound to it unless he 
accepts the offer. See also Franco Ferrari, Fundamental Breach of Contract Under the UN 
Sales Convention—25 Years of Article 25 CISG, 25 J.L. & COM. 489, 500 (2006) (“Allowing 
for communications made after the conclusion of the contract to become relevant would 
permit a unilateral modification of the balance of the parties’ interests as laid out in the 
contract, which is hardly appropriate.”).
33. HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 277.
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B. Shared Tacit Assumptions and the Intrinsic Unreasonableness
of the Foreseeability Test
Professor Eisenberg’s “shared tacit assumption” theory sheds light onto 
the discussion concerning the foreseeability test.34 While negotiating and 
concluding a contract, parties share many tacit assumptions. These 
assumptions may vary from “the sun will rise again tomorrow” to “the crude 
oil price will be steady during the one-month life of the contract.” They are 
a part of the contract in that the parties would not have made the contract, or 
would have agreed otherwise, if they had been fully aware that the assumed 
situations would not come about (“the sun will not rise tomorrow” or “the 
crude oil price will sky-rocket in a month”). They are basic conditions of the 
contract but are simply too basic to merit attention or mention. Professor 
Eisenberg explains:
Shared tacit assumptions . . . are just as much a part of a contract as 
explicit terms, so that where the risk of an unexpected circumstance 
would have been shifted away from the promisor if the assumption 
had been made explicit, an otherwise identical shared tacit 
assumption should operate in the same way.
This approach to shared tacit assumptions is an application of the 
usual hypothetical-contract methodology, under which unspecified 
terms are usually determined on the basis of what the contracting 
parties probably would have agreed to if they had addressed the 
relevant issue.35
According to Professor Schlechtriem’s interpretation of the 
foreseeability test, which fixes the time of foreseeability at the time of 
conclusion of the contract, if the parties are presumed not to have foreseen 
the substantial detriment at the time of conclusion of contract, the contract 
cannot be avoided. On the other hand, if we apply the shared tacit 
assumption theory, the result would likely be the opposite. This theory 
assumes that, if they had addressed the issue of an unforeseeable situation 
resulting from a breach, it is very likely that, in most circumstances, the 
parties would have agreed, “if a breach of our contact causes a detriment 
more substantial than reasonable merchants like us could have foreseen, the 
contract should be avoided.” This assumption seems supported in fact; it 
represents what reasonable merchants will agree to if they do address the 
issue of the unforeseeable consequence of a breach.36 It is also justified 
34. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration, 1 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 207, 211–14 (2009).
35. Id. at 214.
36. See id. at 219 (The “shared-assumption test” “allocates away from the adversely 
affected party the risk that a certain kind of unexpected circumstance will occur if the parties 
share a tacit assumption that the circumstance will not occur.”).
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because it prevents an irrational consequence inherent in the foreseeability 
test: leaving the fatally defective goods in the hands of the buyer without 
relieving him of his obligation to pay.
Functionally, under the shared tacit assumption framework, one of the 
biggest problems with the foreseeability test—the point at which a seller 
must foresee the consequences of breach—is resolved, but the test itself 
becomes still more useless: We do not need to know what the seller foresaw 
if we can simply assume that the parties would wish to avoid contracts when 
substantial detriment is unforeseeable.
IV.  Searching for a Criterion of Substantiality
In Parts II and III, we saw that the role that the foreseeability test plays 
is very limited, suggesting that the test brings irrational results even in the 
narrow area where it can be applied: According to the foreseeability test,
when the consequence of a breach is unforeseeable cannot be avoided, and 
this is often at odds with justice. Thus, the foreseeability test is useless at 
best and paradoxical at worst. It is “an unfortunate historical mistake”37 and 
should be nullified in the jurisprudence.38 Instead, I argue that courts and 
parties alike should rely on parties’ good faith attempts to cure to determine 
the fundamentality of the breach.
The foreseeability test is as good as dead.  Please do not let it rule from 
its grave.39 With foreseeability discarded, all that prevents article 25 from 
being consistently applied are the questions we started with: What makes a 
breach fundamental? When is a detriment substantial?
A. Lack of Administrable Criteria
Reading through cases hinging on fundamental breach under article 25 
gives the impression that they were decided by hunch rather than by a 
verbatim application of the letters of article 25. Surprisingly, some cases do 
not quote from article 25 at all. Others do not even mention the words
“Article 25.”
37. Schroeter, supra note 12, at 420, ¶5 (“[I]n fact [the foreseeability test] had become 
superfluous—an unfortunate historical mistake, which has caused and still is causing some 
confusion in the interpretation of Article 25.”).
38. Tellingly, the nullification of the test is no big deal for the CISG jurisprudence 
because the test rarely plays an active role. For example, Professor Epstein criticizes the 
foreseeability test for ignoring commonplace assumptions of professional businessmen. See
Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 124 (1989) (“Foresight here [in Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 ENG. 
REP. 145 (Ex. Ch. 1854)], like reasonableness in so many quarters of the law, utterly lacks the 
descriptive content that allows it to be the principled basis for decision.”).
39. See F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 2 (A.H. Chaytor 
& W.J. Whittaker eds. 1936) (“The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from 
their graves.”).
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An example is the Germany Iron-Molybdenum Case.40 The buyer 
contracted with the seller to deliver iron-molybdenum from China under the 
international commercial shipping term (“Incoterm”) “CIF Rotterdam.” 
Later, on several occasions, the seller demanded price increases for the 
commodity, due to a rise in market price, each time missing and then 
renewing the delivery date. The buyer avoided the contract and made a 
substitute purchase, just as he had warned the seller he would.
The Appellate Court of Hamburg stated that the buyer’s special interest 
(expectation) in the timely delivery could be inferred from the parties’ use 
of Incoterm CIF “under which timely delivery is a fundamental obligation” 
of the seller.41 The seller breached the obligation and “left the Buyer in 
complete uncertainty as to whether and when it would comply with its 
obligation to deliver.”42 Noting this, the court found a fundamental breach. 
Although the court referred to articles 25 and 49, it did not quote from these 
provisions, and it did not evaluate whether there was a substantial 
deprivation of the buyer’s legitimate expectations.
Another example is the France Laminated Sheet Metal Case.43 The 
laminated sheet metal that the seller delivered to the buyer failed to comply 
with the contract both in quantity and quality, and the delivery was late by 
more than one month. The Supreme Court of France (the Cour de 
Cassation) listed the defects in the seller’s goods and quoted the expert’s 
findings: “After all the tests and visual examination, I can affirm that the 
sheets are absolutely unacceptable for the use for which they were 
destined.”44 The Court held that “the goods delivered were not conforming, 
in their definitive characteristics[,] with respect to those which had been 
ordered,”45 and concluded that the buyer’s avoidance was well-founded. The 
Court, however, did not quote from articles 25 or 49. It did not even 
mention the titles of these articles.
On the other hand, the U.S. Compressors for Air-Conditioners Case is 
an example in which a court duly specified the factors amounting to 
substantial deprivation of legitimate expectations while quoting from article 
25.46 The seller, a manufacturer of compressors for air conditioners, agreed 
to sell 10,800 compressors to the buyer, a manufacturer of air conditioners. 
40. Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Provincial Court of Appeal] Feb. 28, 1997, 1 U 167/95, 
translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970228g1.html (last updated Sept. 
12, 2007) (Ger.) (Iron-Molybdenum Case).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court] May 26, 1999, P 97-14.315, Arrêt no. 
994 D, translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990526f1.html (last updated 
June 19, 2007) (Fr.) (Laminated Sheet Metal Case).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(Compressor Case). 
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The contract provided for the delivery in three shipments. The seller made 
the first shipment. While the second shipment was en route, the buyer 
discovered that 93% of the compressors in the first shipment were non-
conforming: They had less cooling capacity and consumed more electricity 
than required by contract specifications. The buyer rejected the second 
shipment and stored it at the port of delivery. After trying unsuccessfully to 
cure the defects of the first shipment, the buyer demanded that the seller 
reship conforming compressors, but the seller refused. The buyer declared 
the contract avoided. The U.S. Court of Appeal held:
In granting summary judgment, the district court held that “[t]here 
appears to be no question that [the buyer] did not substantially 
receive that which [it] was entitled to expect” and that “any 
reasonable person could foresee that shipping non-conforming 
goods to a buyer would result in the buyer not receiving that which 
he expected and was entitled to receive.” Because the cooling 
power and energy consumption of an air conditioner compressor 
are important determinants of the product’s value, the district 
court’s conclusion that [the seller] was liable for a fundamental 
breach of contract under the Convention was proper.47
Thus, the court, properly quoting from article 25, duly enumerated 
aggravating factors of a breach and concluded that this situation qualified as 
substantial detriment.
However, even reasoning like this, which cites to article 25 directly, 
appears to be lacking something. We still do not have a criterion to 
determine “how bad is bad.”  We still need to know how many of the 
enumerated, injurious factors are required or how serious they must be to 
satisfy the requirement of substantial detriment. In other words, there needs 
to be an interpretative criterion that tells us when to apply the text of article 
25 to the facts of the case at hand.
To see why this is so, consider by analogy CISG article 39(1), which 
provides: “The buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the 
goods if he does not give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the 
lack of conformity within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or 
ought to have discovered it.”48 What “a reasonable time” means in this 
provision has long been a subject of controversy.49 There is one potential 
criterion which sets the limit at one month.50 That is, if the buyer gives the 
seller notice of non-conformity within a month, his notice is regarded as 
given within a reasonable time, so he does not lose the right to rely on the 
47. Id. at 1028–29.
48. CISG, supra note 1, art. 39(1).
49. See Ingeborg Schwenzer, National Preconceptions That Endanger Uniformity, 19
PACE INT’L L. REV. 103, 104, 109–11 (2007).
50. Id. at 111–24.
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non-conformity and can claim damages based on it.51 If a court adopts this 
criterion in applying article 39(1), its analysis will have two stages: It must 
first articulate the prevalent rule that a reasonable time of notice is one 
month. and then it must ascertain whether the delay involved in the case at 
hand is within that reasonable length of time (i.e., a month). If it is, the court 
will consider notice properly given and allow the buyer to claim for 
remedies for the non-conforming goods.
To determine the requisite level of substantial deprivation of a buyer’s 
legitimate expectations, there appears to be no operable interpretative 
criterion which judges can invoke. Without an interpretive guide, judges 
will be limited to listing those detrimental factors which in their perception 
should be sufficient to overcome the hurdle of substantiality.52 Criteria 
suggested by courts include “when the purpose of the contract is endangered 
so seriously that, for the concerned party to the contract, interest in the 
fulfilment of the contract ceases to exist as a consequence of the breach,”53
or when a breach “concern[s] the essential content of the contract, the 
goods, or the payment of the price concerned . . . lead[ing] to serious 
consequences to the economic goal pursued by the parties.”54
Although these criteria might fit the facts of the cases where they were 
announced, they are not only as abstract as the language of article 25 itself, 
but they also seem to deviate from it. For example, unlike in the latter 
criterion above, article 25 does not stipulate that a breach must concern the 
“essential content” of the contract, and a breach of a minor term of the 
contract, such as the manner of packaging, could still lead to a substantial 
detriment.55
51. Id. I have suggested a criterion that is similar, but that varies in a critical way: a 
rebuttable presumption that one month is “a reasonable time.” That is, if the buyer gives the 
seller notice of non-conformity within a month, he is presumed to have complied with the 
requirement of article 39(1). At the same time, the criterion allows for the seller’s rebuttal that 
he has suffered substantial prejudice from the delay. That is, even when the buyer gives notice 
of non-conformity within a month, he loses the right to rely on the non-conformity if delay 
caused substantial prejudice to the seller. See Yasutoshi Ishida, CISG Art. 38 & 39 and 
Japanese Commercial Code Article 526—Examination of Goods and Notice of Non-
conformity: “One Month No Prejudice” Test, 56 HIMEJI L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2015).
52. See, e.g., 71 F.3d. at 1028–29, supra note 46.
53. Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt [OLGZ] [Frankfurt Court of Appeal] Sept. 17, 1991, 5 
U 164/90, translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/910917g1.html (last 
updated Mar. 20, 2007) (Ger.) (Shoes Case).
54. Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Sept. 15, 2000, 4C.105/2000, 
translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000915s2.html (last updated Feb. 16, 
2007) (Switz.) (Egyptian Cotton Case).
55. See BENJAMIN K. LEISINGER, FUNDAMENTAL BREACH CONSIDERING NON-
CONFORMITY OF THE GOODS 132 (2007) (“Where the buyer purchases the goods for resale 
and the non-conforming packaging leads to the consequence that the goods cannot be 
immediately resold—as in string transactions—within the buyer’s normal course of business, 
the buyer is entitled to avoid the contract. Here, because of the circumstances prevalent in the 
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However, judges are not to blame. As is rightly pointed out, “the 
concept of fundamental breach depends upon the concept of substantial 
deprivation, but a definition of the latter is not found in the provision, 
leaving the interpreter without a benchmark as to the extent of deprivation 
required to constitute a fundamental breach.”56 It may be impossible to 
contrive a universal criterion which could bridge the language of article 25 
and the unique facts of each case. The existence of a fundamental breach 
depends on too many aleatory parameters that can vary depending on the 
kind of transaction and of goods, and on the nature and extent of the breach 
involved. These complexities seem to prevent any attempt to make a 
universal criterion. Therefore, this article takes a different approach.
B. Substantiality of Deprivation in Terms of Availability of Remedy
The thesis of this article is that the curability of defects can play a role 
in the substantial detriment test, and that the determination of curability 
should be made by the parties, who are the most acquainted with their own 
predicament. One might think that the substantiality of a deprivation 
resulting from the non-conformity of goods could be represented by the 
gravity of the goods’ defects. That is, the more defective the goods are, the 
more the buyer is deprived of his legitimate expectation. This idea is wrong: 
However defective the goods may be at the time of delivery, no substantial 
detriment will ensue if the seller promptly tenders a wholesome substitute. 
This makes sense: The availability of a remedy, not the gravity of initial 
defects, corresponds to the extent of the buyer’s economic loss. That is, the 
more easily a remedy is available, the less economic loss will fall on the 
buyer.57 (Consider: Even if a machine made according to the buyer’s 
specifications stays dormant after the buyer turns on its power, the machine 
may be easily and quickly repaired by replacement of a simple part.) Thus,
the substantiality of a deprivation actually depends on the availability of a 
reasonable remedy.
In challenge to the idea of incorporating availability of remedy into the 
substantial detriment test, one might rightly think that there are infinite 
degrees of remediability. To marshal this complication, this author suggests 
the following methodology: In Part V, this article considers the two 
commodity trade, any delay caused by packaging or repackaging the goods would lead to an 
unreasonable delay and expose the buyer to unreasonable risk.”).
56. Eduardo Grebler, Fundamental Breach of Contract Under the CISG: A 
Controversial Rule, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 407, 409 (2007). Professor Zeller further 
pointed out that the term “detriment” in article 25 also “takes on substance within a particular 
context only, that is, within a contract.” ZELLER, supra note 7, ¶13.29.
57. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 689 
(2018) (explaining that to determine the applicability of avoidance, “four dimensions should 
be taken into account: the likelihood of future performance by the promisor, the economic 
significance of the breach, whether the breach was opportunistic, and the possibility of 
cure.”).
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extremes on the spectrum of remediability—goods easily obtainable, 
resalable, or repairable, on the one hand, and goods irreparably defective on 
the other. There arises no substantial detriment in the former, and a judge 
can readily admit a fundamental breach in the latter.
Between these two ends, there are of course many sorts of remedies for 
defective goods that elude a definite categorization.58 These nebulous cases 
will be extensively scrutinized in Part VI. In general, the most flagrant 
breach by the seller is non-delivery of the goods. However, problems 
concerning non-delivery or late delivery are excluded in the following 
analyses, with some exceptions, because they seldom raise a serious 
question of whether a deprivation was substantial.59
V.  Testing Remedy as a Criterion: Goods Easily Obtainable, 
Resalable, or Repairable and Goods Irreparably Defective
As explained in the last section, I recommend evaluating availability of 
remedy through four categories of defective goods: (1) those that are easily 
obtainable or resalable, (2) those that are easily repairable, (3) those that are 
irreparably defective, and (4) those that are in between, i.e., those that are 
possibly repairable or substitutable.  In this part, the first three categories are 
considered. The fourth category, which requires extensive analysis, will be 
discussed in Part VI.
A. Easily Obtainable or Resalable Goods
A sales contract for commodities or fungible goods will not usually 
raise the issue of the substantiality of the seller’s breach because the 
drawbacks of such a breach can usually be covered by a substitute contract, 
which buyers can relatively easily obtain upon a seller’s breach.  Professor 
Leisinger demonstrates this in his definition of “commodity”:
The term “commodity” includes a broad field of products ranging 
from oil to bulk chemicals to wheat, corn, soybeans, rice, cotton, 
lumber, gas, propane, orange juice, RAM chips, copper, lead, gold, 
and even pork bellies. What all these goods have in common is that 
they are produced in very large quantities, by many different 
producers and that they are considered substitutable. They are 
58. For a thorough list of factors to be considered in determining a fundamentality of 
breach, see generally Koch, supra note 14.
59. This is because the buyer can extend the period of delivery by a reasonable length 
according to article 47(1), and, if the seller fails to deliver within that period, the buyer can 
avoid the contract under article 49(1)(b), without getting into the question of fundamental 
breach (or substantial detriment). CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(1)(b) (“The buyer may declare 
the contract avoided . . . in case of non-delivery, if the seller does not deliver the goods within 
the additional period of time fixed by the buyer in accordance with paragraph (1) of article 47 
or declares that he will not deliver within the period so fixed.”).
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interchangeable. The broadest definition of commodities is 
“anything that has a use value.” 60
He also explains the reasons why a breach of a commodity contract 
rarely becomes fundamental. First, as to a discrepancy of quantity, he states:
In the trade of commodities, where there are an almost unlimited 
number of substitutable sellers selling exchangeable goods. . . . [i]f 
the seller delivers a quantity less than the one contracted for, there 
can never be a fundamental breach of the contract. The reason for 
this is that in such a situation the buyer can always be expected to 
cure the defect himself by purchasing the missing quantity, for 
example, on the spot/cash market, and to then claim damages.61
The Germany Computer Parts Case is illustrative.62 The buyer 
concluded a contract for the sale of eleven computer parts with the seller. 
The buyer was planning to use them to fulfil an order placed by his client. 
After delivery of five parts, the buyer refused payment and declared the 
contract avoided on the grounds that six parts remained undelivered. The 
German district court held that even the delivery of only five parts out of 
eleven would not entitle the buyer to avoid the contract in its entirety, 
because the buyer’s declaration of avoidance did not meet the requirement 
of CISG article 51(2), which provides, “The buyer may declare the contract 
avoided in its entirety only if the failure to make delivery completely or in 
conformity with the contract amounts to a fundamental breach of the 
contract.”63 The court further held that in order to achieve the purpose of the 
contract in cases of a breach by the seller, the buyer may be expected to 
make a substitute transaction. Since it turned out that the buyer had already 
obtained the missing six parts by a substitute purchase before he avoided the 
contract, the court found that no fundamental breach was committed. The 
real reason for the buyer’s avoidance was the withdrawal of his client’s 
order.
This case is very instructive in three ways. First, a shortage of the 
agreed quantity was in fact held not to constitute a fundamental breach—in 
accordance with Professor Leisinger’s position reported above.64 Second, 
the amount of the shortage as a proportion of the total order is not directly 
connected to the gravity of the breach. In the above case, six out of eleven 
parts were not delivered. The rate of failure was approximately 55%. This 
60. LEISINGER, supra note 55, at 114–15.
61. Id. at 126–27. However, a fundamental breach may occur if the buyer and/or the 
seller refuse substitution even though it can reasonably be made. These cases are discussed in 
Sections D and E of Part VI below.
62. Landgericht Heidelberg [LG] [District Court of Heidelberg], July 3, 1992, O 42/92
KfH I, translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/920703g1.html (last updated 
Mar. 20, 2007) (Ger.) (Computer Components Case).
63. CISG, supra note 1, art. 51(2).
64. See LEISINGER, supra note 55, at 126–27.
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might seem sufficient to be recognized as a substantial deprivation of the 
buyer’s legitimate expectations on a quantitative basis. However, the court 
rightly held that the breach was not fundamental, because, by the substitute 
purchase, the buyer’s aim was attained. Third, this case shows that 
curability of breach can function as a proxy for the substantiality test, just as 
this article advocates.
As to a non-conformity of quality, Professor Leisinger explains, if the 
buyer purchased commodities for a particular purpose known to the seller, 
and if they cannot be used for this purpose, the buyer must purchase 
additional goods of the right quality and hence may avoid the contract.65
However, he argues, if the buyer has not purchased the commodities for any 
particular purpose, but merely for the general purpose of resale, the buyer 
must not be allowed to avoid the contract as long as she can resell them.66
The Switzerland Meat Case is illustrative on this point.67 The frozen 
meat that the seller delivered to the buyer, a wholesaler of meat, contained 
significantly more fat and water than the agreed standard and was estimated 
to be worth 25.5% less than the meat specified by the contract. The buyer 
argued that by the local food trade standard, a disparity of greater than 10% 
allows the buyer to avoid the contract. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court 
held that the gravity of a deviation of quality is not dispositive, and that 
whether further processing is possible and reasonable in the particular 
circumstances is relevant to the case’s disposition. Furthermore, because the 
buyer was a wholesaler who could resell the meat in his usual course of 
business, without an unreasonable effort—albeit with a markdown—the 
Court denied avoidance.
B. Easily Repairable Goods
In cases where non-fungible goods are involved, such as a machine 
made according to specifications provided by the buyer, a fundamental 
breach will rarely be identified if the defect of the goods is a relatively 
benign one which can easily or obviously be repaired. For example, even if 
a machine specifically designed for the buyer’s production line stays 
dormant after turning on the power, it may be easily and quickly repaired by 
the replacement of a simple part. In that case, there is no fundamental 
breach and avoidance is inappropriate.
One such case is the French Used Warehouse Case, where the buyer 
declared the contract avoided because the metal parts of a portable 
65. The buyer must obtain substitute goods, but he will not have much difficulty in 
procuring them in the market so long as they are fungible. The same is true of the seller, who, 
in case of the avoidance by the buyer, can easily find another buyer. LEISINGER, supra note 
55, at 129–30.
66. See id. at 130. 
67. Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Oct. 28, 1998, 4 C. 179/1998/odi, 
translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981028s1.html (last updated Nov. 
15, 2007) (Switz.) (Meat Case).
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warehouse were defective.68 The French Court of Appeal (Cour d’appel) 
held that “[s]ince that defect related to only part of the warehouse and 
concerned metal elements which could be repaired, it did not constitute a 
fundamental breach such as to deprive the buyer of what he was entitled to 
expect under the contract.”69
C. Irreparably Defective Goods
The two categories above concern cases where it is relatively obvious 
that the seller’s non-compliance does not constitute a fundamental breach. 
We now turn to the cases where the converse is true: It is relatively obvious 
that the seller’s non-compliance indeed constitutes a fundamental breach.
In some of these cases, the goods sold and delivered can be described as 
irreparably defective because their defects are so serious as not to allow for 
any use or cure. An example of defects falling into this category is present 
in the Netherland Wheat Flour Case.70 The seller concluded a contract for 
the sale of wheat flour with the buyer, an international trading company. 
Upon delivery, it was confiscated by the authorities because the seller had 
added to the flour a bread-enhancing substance containing potassium 
bromate, an additive prohibited in the European Union as a genotoxic 
carcinogen. The buyer declared the contract avoided. The District Appeal 
Court in the Netherland found the seller’s breach fundamental.
It is indisputable that the goods involved were irreparably defective. 
The wheat flour that the seller delivered to the buyer was confiscated by the 
authorities because it contained a prohibited substance. It is true that wheat 
flour is a kind of commodity or fungible good, and that both parties were 
trading companies, but the buyer could not possibly resell the goods 
confiscated by the authorities because of the ingredient causing cancer.
Another example is the Germany Sport Clothing Case.71 The sportswear 
that the buyer had bought from the seller and resold to customers became 
distinctly smaller, shrinking one to two sizes, after being washed them for 
the first time. As a result, the end customers could no longer wear the 
68. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Grenoble Apr. 26, 1995 93/4879,
translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950426f2.html (last updated Dec. 2, 
2005) (Fr.) (Used Warehouse Case). 
69. Id.  See also, UNCITRAL, Digest of Case Law on the U.N. Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, at 115, art. 25, ¶9, (2016), 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/clout/CISG_Digest_2016.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL 
Digest] (“Some courts have held that easy repairability precludes finding a fundamental 
breach.”).
70. Hof’s–Gravenhage 23 april 2003, NJ 2003, 713 m.nt. (Rynpoort Trading & 
Transport NV et al/Meneba Meel Wormerveer B.V. et al.), translation available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030423n1.html (last updated Jan. 19, 2005) (Neth.) (Wheat 
Flour Case).
71. Landgericht Landshut [LG] [District Court of Landshut] Apr. 5, 1995, 54 O 644/94, 
translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950405g1.html (last updated March 
20, 2007) (Ger.) (Sport Clothing Case). 
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clothes after washing; they were irreparably defective, with no room for 
cure.
Yet another example is the Germany Used Shoes Case.72 The buyer, a 
company based in Kampala, Uganda, bought used shoes from the seller. The 
contract provided for delivery “FOB Mombasa, Kenya.” After the goods 
arrived at Mombasa, the buyer had the goods transported to Kampala, 
Uganda, where he examined them. Upon examination, the buyer discovered 
that the consignments contained only defective and unusable shoes and shoe 
storage accessories, including high-heeled shoes, inline-skates, and shoe 
trees. In addition, the Uganda National Bureau of Standards disapproved the 
import of the shoes because of their bad and unhygienic condition, 
recommending their destruction. The buyer declared the contract avoided. 
The District Court in Frankfurt found a fundamental breach by the seller.73
In these cases, in contravention of article 35 of the CISG,74 the goods 
failed to comply with the specifications of their contracts and were not only 
unfit for ordinary purpose but also for any particular purpose. In other 
words, the defects were so serious as to make the goods entirely useless. In 
these circumstances, the pecuniary loss which the buyers suffered is not 
72. Landgericht Frankfurt [LG] [District Court of Frankfurt] Apr. 11, 2005, 12/26 O 
264/04, translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050411g1.html (last updated 
Dec. 10, 2008) (Ger.) (Used Shoes Case).
73. However, the court denied relief on the ground that the examination of the goods 
and notice of non-conformity were too late and that the buyer was precluded from relying on 
non-conformity according to article 39(1). As to the details of this case and the irrationality of 
the decision, see Ishida, supra note 51, at 15–23.
74. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 35, which provides: 
(1) The seller must deliver goods which are of the quantity, quality and description 
required by the contract and which are contained or packaged in the manner 
required by the contract.
(2) Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not conform with 
the contract unless they: 
(a) are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would 
ordinarily be used; 
(b) are fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to the 
seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract, except where the 
circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or that it was unreasonable for 
him to rely, on the seller’s skill and judgement; 
(c) possess the qualities of goods which the seller has held out to the buyer as 
a sample or model; 
(d) are contained or packaged in the manner usual for such goods or, where 
there is no such manner, in a manner adequate to preserve and protect the 
goods. 
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limited to the total loss of the proceeds the buyer had expected from the 
transaction, but it may also include the future loss of profit resulting from its 
vitiated reputation.75 There is no doubt that the buyer had a right to avoid the 
contract.
The following quote from the UNCITRAL Digest pertinently sums up 
these findings:
Leading court decisions on what constitutes a fundamental 
breach . . . have held that a non-conformity concerning quality is 
not a fundamental breach of contract if the buyer can, without 
unreasonable inconvenience, use the goods or resell them, even 
with a rebate. Thus, e.g., the delivery of frozen meat that contained 
too much fat and water . . . was deemed not to constitute a 
fundamental breach of contract because the buyer could resell the 
meat at a lower price or could process it in an alternative manner. If 
non-conforming goods cannot be used or resold with reasonable 
effort, however, there is a fundamental breach. The same is true 
where the goods suffer from a serious defect, even though they can 
still be used to some extent (e.g. flowers that should have 
flourished the whole summer but in fact did so only for a small part 
of the season), or where the goods have major defects and the buyer 
requires the goods for its manufacturing processes. Similarly, 
where the non-conformity resulted from the adulteration of the 
goods in a fashion that was illegal in the states of both the seller 
and the buyer, a fundamental breach was found.76
VI.  Identifying a Line in the Sand of Substantiality: 
A Good Faith Duty to Cure Defects
This part tackles the most formidable problem for courts in identifying 
fundamental breaches: cases in which the gravity of a defect reaches a 
sufficient level that the buyer could invoke the right to declare the contract 
avoided, but in which the remediability of the defect cannot be easily 
determined. Generally, these cases involve goods which are neither easily 
obtainable, resalable, or repairable, nor irreparably defective. As Part V 
demonstrated, judges can readily deny a fundamental breach in the former 
case and affirm one in the latter. But between these two poles, there is chaos 
75. See Nicholas Whittington, Reconsidering Domestic Sale of Goods Remedies in 
Light of the CISG, 37 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 421, 435 (2006) (In determining the 
fundamentality of breach the “economic loss of the nonbreaching party is likely to be the most 
prominent of these considerations. But, in addition, the question can encompass the 
consideration of factors such as loss of the nonbreaching party’s reputation. . . .”), available at
http://www.nzlii.org/nz/journals/VUWLawRw/2006/20.html.
76. UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 69, at 222, art. 46, ¶13, (2016), 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/clout/CISG_Digest_2016.pdf.
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in which judges will have a hard time determining whether the breach has 
caused substantial detriment.
It seems next to impossible to formulate a criterion capable of 
consistent application. Once judges have decided to acknowledge 
substantial detriment, they can itemize those facts in their case which tend 
to justify avoidance. Once they have decided no detriment is present, they 
will hold that the aggravating factors that the buyer’s lawyer has 
enumerated are insufficient to form a fundamental breach. In general, those 
decisions cannot help becoming arbitrary because there is no universal, 
objective criterion, and there are innumerable kinds of factors, from 
manifold transactions, that may or may not contribute to substantial 
detriment. The presence of substantial detriment depends on so many 
parameters as to freeze any attempt at clear-cut definition.
Yet if we look more abstractly, removing ourselves from the dismaying 
complexities in this middle field, we will find that the kernel of the problem 
is technical rather than legal. This is where this article offers a solution: The 
quandary of what constitutes a substantial detriment can be overcome by the 
substitution or repair of goods. If a malfunctioning machine has been 
successfully repaired, there is no substantial detriment and hence the buyer 
has no grounds for avoiding the contract. If such an attempt has failed, then, 
depending on how much it accomplished, the buyer may have no choice but 
to avoid the contract.
Unfortunately, however, there is no provision in the CISG which 
obliges the parties to attempt to cure a shipment’s defects. One of the 
relevant provisions, article 46(2), says that “the buyer may require delivery 
of substitute goods.”77 Another relevant provision, article 48(1) says, “the 
seller may . . . remedy . . . any failure to perform his obligations.”78 Literally 
read, these provisions imply that the parties do not necessarily have to 
attempt to cure the defects. The CISG Advisory Council in its opinion No.5
advocated, “There is no fundamental breach where the non-conformity can
be remedied either by the seller or the buyer without unreasonable 
inconvenience to the buyer or delay inconsistent with the weight accorded 
to the time of performance.”79 However, even if the non-conformity can be 
remedied in a reasonable manner, the seller and the buyer may leave it as it 
is. What if the seller can remedy the non-conformity, but he will not? Is the 
buyer precluded from avoiding the contract because there is no fundamental 
breach so long as the non-conformity can be remedied?
The discussion that follows demonstrates that the obligation to remedy 
is imposed both on the seller and the buyer under CISG articles 25, 46(2) 
77. CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(2) (emphasis added).
78. Id. art. 48(1) (emphasis added).
79. Opinion no. 5 of the CISG Advisory Council, The Buyer’s Right to Avoid the 
Contract in Case of Non-Conforming Goods or Documents (May 7, 2005), reported by
Ingeborg Schwenzer, Professor of Private Law at University of Basel (emphasis added).
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and (3), and 48(1), buttressed by the good faith principle provided in article 
7(1).
A. Possibility of Cure and the Right of the Buyer to Avoid
As discussed above, article 49 provides in part: “The buyer may declare 
the contract avoided: (a) if the failure by the seller to perform any of his 
obligations under the contract or this Convention amounts to a fundamental 
breach of contract.”80 Courts and commentators generally agree that initial 
defects of goods do not constitute a fundamental breach that entitles the 
buyer to avoid the contract, if there is a possibility that the seller can remedy 
those defects.81 Further, one of those commentators writes:
The result is the same if the view is taken that the buyer’s right to 
avoid is suspended so long as substitute delivery or cure is possible 
and genuinely offered and the time needed to make substitute 
delivery or to repair will not in itself lead to a fundamental breach 
by exceeding the contractually-agreed date for delivery.82
The rationale of this opinion is based on the idea that, however serious a 
breach may be initially, so long as it is curable, it does not substantially 
deprive the buyer of his legitimate expectations and hence is not qualified as 
a fundamental breach. In other words, “the preconditions for a fundamental 
breach of contract (articles 25 and 49(1)(a)) generally do not exist as long as 
the preconditions” of remedial measures are met.83 This opinion is based on 
three assumptions. The first is that whether the cure is actually possible can 
be determined at the time of delivery or shortly after it. Second is that the 
cure is reasonably practicable with moderate cost and time. Third is that the 
parties will undertake to cure.
The opinion appears to be basically correct as a matter of law, but, as 
the CISG has been commonly understood until this point, two of these three 
assumptions about the availability of cure are suspect. First, in cases where 
fundamentality of breach is questioned, whether a defect is reasonably 
curable cannot always be judged at the time of delivery. In some cases, it 
cannot conclusively be determined until the seller’s attempts to cure are 
borne out. If the attempts turn out to be futile, the buyer will have unduly 
been waiting for nothing, suspending its right to avoid in vain. In other 
words, what seemed to be curable defect at first was not curable in fact. The 
buyer could have avoided immediately after the delivery and arranged for a 
cover purchase. On these grounds, this approach lacks a supplementary 
theory which justifies obliging the buyer to wait.
80. CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(1).
81. Schroeter, supra note 12, at 445–46, ¶ 47.
82. Id.
83. Markus Müller-Chen, Article 48, in SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12,
at 770, ¶ 18.
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Second, there appears to be no provision of the CISG, read alone, that 
obliges the buyer and seller to attempt to cure the defects. Article 48(1) 
provides that the seller “may” remedy his failure to perform.84 In ordinary 
meaning, the auxiliary verb “may” implies that the seller does not 
necessarily have to cure if he does not so wish. Maybe he will, or maybe he 
will not, even if at the time of delivery, the defect is clearly and definitely 
curable with minimum cost, within a reasonable time. In the same vein, 
article 46, sections (2) and (3) provide that the buyer “may” require the 
seller to deliver substitute goods or to repair defective goods.85 The buyer 
does not necessarily have to do so if he does not so wish. Maybe he will 
require remedy by the seller, or maybe not if he wishes to avoid the 
contract.
A drastic remedy like avoidance should not depend on such 
indeterminate and unforeseeable conduct by the parties. If measures for cure 
are to survive an immediate avoidance by the buyer, we need to contrive 
interpretations of the relevant provisions of the CISG which will oblige the 
seller and the buyer to attempt to remedy the seller’s non-compliance. 
Moreover, an obligation to cure may dispense with troubles and burdens for 
the seller entailed in the avoidance by the buyer. For in case of avoidance, 
the seller not only misses the profit he expected from the sale but also must 
bear the cost of storing the rejected goods and taking them back, and he 
might also have to pay expectation damages to the buyer.
There are two issues relevant to this inquiry: the buyer’s right to require 
the seller to cure the lack of conformity, and the seller’s right to offer to 
remedy his failure. In the following sections, we will examine these rights 
and convert them into obligations, with the help of the principle of good 
faith.
84. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 48(1), which provides:
Subject to article 49, the seller may, even after the date for delivery, remedy at his 
own expense any failure to perform his obligations, if he can do so without 
unreasonable delay and without causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or 
uncertainty of reimbursement by the seller of expenses advanced by the buyer. 
However, the buyer retains any right to claim damages as provided for in this 
Convention.
85. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 46, which provides: 
(2) If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may require delivery of 
substitute goods only if the lack of conformity constitutes a fundamental breach of 
contract and a request for substitute goods is made either in conjunction with notice 
given under article 39 or within a reasonable time thereafter. 
(3) If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may require the seller 
to remedy the lack of conformity by repair, unless this is unreasonable having 
regard to all the circumstances. A request for repair must be made either in 
conjunction with notice given under article 39 or within a reasonable time 
thereafter. 
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B. Buyer’s Right and Obligation to Require Repair
The buyer’s request to remedy can be fulfilled in two ways: substitution 
or repair. For the sake of relative simplicity of explanation, we will deal 
with the latter first. Article 46(3) provides in relevant part:
If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may 
require the seller to remedy the lack of conformity by repair, unless 
this is unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances.86
As explained above, this provision does not oblige the buyer to require 
the seller to repair the lack of conformity of the goods.87 He may require the 
repair by the seller, and if he chooses to so require, such a request is 
conditioned on the repair’s reasonableness under the circumstances.88
It is to be noted that this buyer’s option to request repair is present in all 
the cases where the goods do not conform to the contract, not just in the 
case of a possible fundamental breach.89 However, relevant to our current 
inquiry is the case in which the lack of conformity does appear to be a 
fundamental breach, and in which it is disputed whether the buyer can resort 
to an immediate avoidance. For this inquiry, at first, we need to examine 
when a request for repair “is unreasonable having regard to all the 
circumstances.”90 When considering whether a request is unreasonable:
[I]t is necessary to weigh the buyer’s interests in repair against the 
seller’s expenses. If there is an objective disparity, repair is 
unreasonable. This is the case in particular when the repair is 
unreasonably expensive for the seller: the costs of repairing the 
goods are disproportionately higher than the costs of acquiring a 
substitute. . . . If the seller is a wholesaler or retailer and thus does 
not have the technical, mechanical, or other skills necessary for the 
repair, and if it is not easily possible for him to have a third party 
86. CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(3).
87. In the case of some minor defects, the buyer himself may fix it, or he may arrange 
for repair by employing an expert in his vicinity, possibly at lower cost, and then demand 
compensation for the cost from the seller. See HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 414 (discussing 
art. 46, § 284) (“Some minor repairs can be made more readily by the buyer, particularly 
when the seller’s facilities for repair are in a distant country. The statutory language was 
designed to encourage a reasonable and flexible approach to such cases.”).
88. CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(3) (“unless this is unreasonable having regard to all the 
circumstances”).
89. For example, article 35 of the CISG is the general provision for the conformity of 
goods, requiring the goods to be of the quantity, quality and description specified by the 
contract. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 35. For full text of Article 35, see supra note 74.
Likewise, article 45 provides in part: “If the seller fails to perform any of his obligations under 
the contract or this Convention, the buyer may (a) exercise the right provided in articles 46 to 
52.” The fundamentality of breach is not prerequisite to the request of repair by the buyer 
under article 46(3). See supra, text accompanying note 86.
90. Id.
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do the work ([e.g.,] a contact repair centre), then repair is 
unreasonable.91
Suppose a case where the fundamentality of breach is at issue and the 
reasons a repair might be unreasonable all are absent. In other words, the 
precondition of reasonableness of repair is satisfied. What shall the buyer 
do? He can choose to declare the contract avoided, because article 46(3) 
says that he may; he does not have to require repair. True, if he does choose 
not to ask for repair and to avoid the contract, he may have a duty to 
mitigate damage to the seller.92 However, all article 77 can do with this kind 
of avoidance is to allow the breaching seller “to claim a reduction in the 
damages in the amount by which the loss should have been mitigated.”93 It 
does not have the direct effect of prohibiting the buyer from relying on the 
breach to declare the contract avoided. Yet an avoidance by the buyer under 
this situation smacks of opportunism.
In my opinion, the principle of good faith, imported from CISG article 
7(1), prohibits the buyer in the above circumstances from avoiding the 
contract, and hence he is obliged to require the seller to repair. But I 
acknowledge that good faith is an amorphous notion, and we should not 
lightly resort to it. In the next section, the notion of good faith is examined 
in the context of a buyer’s request for repair.
C. Principle of Good Faith in the Context of Article 46(3)
The provision of the CISG that imposes the good faith obligation is 
article 7(1), which says, “In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is 
to be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity 
in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade.”94
In determining the content of the amorphous notion of good faith, the
official record of article 7(1), i.e., the “travaux préparatoires[,] arguably are 
91. Markus Müller-Chen, Article 46, in SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12,
at 751, ¶ 40.
92. Sometimes a repair by the buyer himself is required to mitigate damages. See
Victor Knapp, Article 77, in VIENNA COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at 563–64. 
93. CISG, supra note 1, art. 77 (“A party who relies on a breach of contract must take 
such measures as are reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of 
profit, resulting from the breach. If he fails to take such measures, the party in breach may 
claim a reduction in the damages in the amount by which the loss should have been 
mitigated.”). See also Ingeborg Schwenzer, Article 77, in SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER,
supra note 12, at 1105, ¶ 2 (“The duty to mitigate damages is not an enforceable obligation 
under the contract, but rather a non-actionable duty to be taken in the aggrieved party’s own 
interest. Failure to comply with the duty to mitigate damages does not result in the aggrieved 
party’s liability for damages, but rather precludes recovery of any loss which could have been 
avoided.”).
94. CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1) (emphasis added).
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predominantly of historical interest” only,95 rather than of practical use of 
reference. What is worse, the case law on article 7(1) gives little guidance. 
Professor Sheehy describes the judicial situation:
The tangle of cases seems to be making the waters ever murkier as 
the various panels and courts continue to introduce patches of 
domestic law and cobble together resolutions using the term “Good 
Faith” without explaining its content or meaning in applications—it
being variously described as a general principle, a principle with 
specific substance, or simply one of many things that makes one 
party’s position more favourable to [one] adjudicator than another. 
It may be that this mash of ideas more accurately reflects the reality 
of judicial reasoning, but it certainly makes the merchant and the 
legal advisor’s job more difficult. Without a single unifying 
concept, arbitrary though it may be, the notion of Good Faith is a 
nebulous notion probably causing more grief than it resolves, 
introducing more uncertainty without the corollary benefit of 
improving justice or fairness.96
In addition, as Sheehy’s analysis suggests, we cannot resort to analysis 
of comparable domestic law, which would undermine the “international 
character” of the Convention.97 With no interpretive guidance, what is left 
for us is no more than the phrase, “good faith.” We can but resort to the 
definition of a dictionary. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the phrase 
as “fidelity, loyalty . . .; esp. honesty of intention in entering into 
engagements, sincerity in professions.”98
With this definition in mind, how is the obligation of good faith to be 
used in the context of the CISG? Good faith, connoting “honesty of 
intention” or “sincerity in professions,” functions as an “overarching 
principle”99 and can be utilized in an auxiliary way to finish tailoring 
interpretations of other, more explicit provisions of the CISG. Prevention of 
opportunistic avoidances should be regarded as part of article 7(1)’s  good 
faith principle because it is necessary to complete one of the general 
principles of article 7(2)100—keeping the contract alive.101 UNCITRAL 
Digest explains:
95. Bruno Zeller, Four-Corners—The Methodology for Interpretation and Application 
of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, at 102 (May 2003) 
(unpublished PhD thesis, University of Melbourne), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/
4corners.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
96. Benedict Sheehy, Good Faith in the CISG: The Interpretation Problems of Article 
7, in REV. OF THE CISG 2005-2006 153, 193–96 (Pace Int’l L. Rev. ed. 2007).
97. Article 7(1) provides in part: “In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to 
be had to its international character.” CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
98. Good faith, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
99. Sheehy, supra note 96, at 187.
100. CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(2): 
96 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 41:63
[T]he Convention is based upon the favor contractus principle, 
pursuant to which one should adopt approaches that favor finding 
that a contract continues to bind the parties rather than that it has 
been avoided. This view has also been adopted in case law. One 
court expressly referred to the principle of favor contractus, while 
one stated that the Convention’s general principles “provide a 
preference for performance.”102
The principle of good faith comes on the scene when an avoidance is 
suspected to be an opportunistic one. Such an avoidance lacks “honesty of 
intention [and] . . . sincerity in professions.”103 As is shown in the following 
example, an opportunistic avoidance is an avoidance which has no or only a 
dubious grounding in the contract and in law, and which is declared to 
prevent loss or to gain profit from changed circumstances after the 
conclusion of the contract—i.e. in those circumstances when the avoiding 
party is better off avoiding than adhering to the contract:
Between the making of the contract and the time for performance 
there may be wide swings in commodity prices. For example, from 
September to November 1969, the price of beans rose from $180 to 
$260 per long ton, an increase within two months of 44.4%. 
Comparable dislocations result from swings in the value of 
currency. In five days following 24 July 1978, the value of the U.S. 
dollar in Tokyo dropped from 200.10 to 192.10 Yen; a $1,000,000 
contract entered into on July 24, to be paid five days later, would 
have involved a loss of 8 million Yen.
In such settings, the losing party views the contract with regret and 
tends to look with a sharp eye to every aspect of the other’s performance.104
In such a situation, the good faith principle can function to forestall an 
expedient avoidance by the buyer, obliging him to have any non-compliance 
remedied.
Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly 
settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is 
based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable 
by virtue of the rules of private international law.
101. UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 69, art. 7, ¶ 32, at 45.
102. Id. See also ZELLER, supra note 7,  ¶ 13.06:
The basic motivation of the CISG is to keep the contract alive as long as possible, 
as the convention has recognized that cancelling a contract in international trade is 
difficult and should be the remedy of last resort because it triggers the winding 
back of associated contracts such as letters of credit. If any cure will prevent an 
avoidance of a contract, the courts generally will so rule.
103. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 98.
104. Michida, supra note 10, at 279.
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Some will argue that, beginning with the phrase “In the interpretation of 
this Convention,” article 7(1) on its face restricts the observance of good 
faith to the interpretation of the CISG and seems not to directly govern the 
conduct of the parties.105 After all, it is mainly judges who interpret the 
CISG and hence who must evaluate the need to promote the observance of 
good faith. But, take a step back: Article 7(1) is likely not a precept 
requiring honesty or sincerity from a judge sitting on a CISG case and 
interpreting its provisions.106 It would itself be absurd for any law to include 
a redundant admonition for adjudicators not to make an absurd 
interpretation. That would be like a public facility posting a sign prohibiting 
tigers on its front door beside a no-dog sign.
Instead, it is “logically impossible to apply good faith to the Convention 
as a whole without influencing or affecting the behavior of the parties.”107
Article 7(1) requires a judge to scrutinize the conduct of the parties in 
interpreting provisions of the CISG, because a judge never interprets a 
provision abstractly but in terms of the facts of a concrete case for which he 
is sitting. Those facts include the modes of conduct of the parties.108 Notice 
that if a judge were to interpret a provision of the CISG to condone a bad 
faith behavior by a party, that interpretation would be against the principle 
of good faith. The view that good faith “is not to be limited to the 
interpretation of the CISG itself is held by the majority of commentators.”109
However, even as article 7(1) was being negotiated, delegates rightly 
contended that the untrammeled application of an obligation of good faith 
will lead to uncertainty and unpredictability.110 Therefore, it is desirable to 
connect the duty of good faith in article 7(1) with other explicit provisions 
of the CISG.111
Let’s start with article 46(3). In Section B of this part, we saw that the 
buyer’s ability to request repair under article 46(3) is conditioned on the 
105. As Professor Neumann argues, “good faith is understood as an instruction not to 
read the Convention in a strict literal or absurd way.” THOMAS NEUMANN, THE DUTY TO 
COOPERATE IN INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE SCOPE AND ROLE OF ARTICLE 80 CISG 28
(2012).  
106. See Mark Gergen, The Principle of Good Faith in Contract Law, in EISENBERG,
supra note 57, at 708 (“Good faith means sincerity in its Latin form bona fide.”).
107. Zeller, supra note 95, at 102.
108. See Koch, supra note 14, at 207 (“In practice, it appears to be nearly impossible to 
apply this principle to the interpretation of the Convention without also applying it to the 
parties’ conduct.”).
109. Sheehy, supra note 96, at 165–66.
110. The good faith principle in article 7(1) is a product of compromise between the 
delegates who esteemed fair dealing of the parties and those delegates who feared its 
ambiguous notion would lead to uncertainty. See HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 134, art. 7, § 
94.
111. See Sheehy, supra note 96, at 167–68 (“It is not a substantive doctrine then to be 
read into all contracts as an implied term, but a guide to thinking about whether and how other 
terms should be read in to a contract, or applied to a particular fact pattern.”).
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absence of unreasonableness (“unless this is unreasonable having regard to 
all the circumstances.”).112 The interpretation that article 46(3) obliges the 
buyer to require the seller to repair is buttressed by the good faith principle. 
Consider: When, taking account of all the circumstances, repair would be 
reasonable, the buyer’s choice not to repair and to instead avoid seems 
irrational and motivated by some reason external to the contract at hand. 
Take, for example, a situation in which a machine that the buyer ordered has 
turned out to be seriously flawed, but the seller is able and willing to repair 
it in a relatively short time with moderate cost and in compliance with other 
conditions of reasonableness. If the buyer, who has no special interest in 
rigid punctuality of delivery, refuses an offer by the seller to repair, the 
refusal smacks of an opportunistic avoidance in which the buyer takes 
advantage of the defects as a pretext (e.g., the opportunity to purchase a 
machine at a lower price which has better or comparable specifications). 
Such an attempt lacks “honesty of intention” or “sincerity in professions” on 
the part of the buyer and is contrary to the favor contractus principle of 
article 7(2). Thus, the principle of good faith of article 7(1), in collaboration 
with the general pro-contract principle of article 7(2), obliges the buyer to 
require the seller to cure.113
D. Buyer’s Right and Obligation to Require Substitute Goods
The buyer’s right to require substitute goods is provided in article 46(2), 
which reads:
If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may 
require delivery of substitute goods only if the lack of conformity 
constitutes a fundamental breach of contract and a request for 
substitute goods is made either in conjunction with notice given 
under article 39 or within a reasonable time thereafter.114
Can the buyer immediately declare the contract avoided before 
requiring substitute goods on the ground that a non-conformity is a 
112. CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(3).
113. A district court in Italy, in a case involving a defective machine, once stated that 
avoiding the contract without granting a seller the opportunity to cure defects in the goods is 
contrary to the principle of good faith which governs international transactions. See Trib. di 
Busto Arsizio, 13 Dec. 2001, n.1192, translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/011213i3.html (last updated Nov. 12, 2012) (It.) (Machinery Case); see also Sheehy, 
supra note 96, at 186–87.
114. CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(2). This provision is mainly meant for commodities or 
fungible goods, along with goods that are mass-produced or for which replacements are 
otherwise readily available. See also, Peter Huber, Article 46, in UN COMMENTARY, supra
note 16, at 682 (“Art. 46(2) entitles the buyer to claim delivery of substitute goods. This 
means that the seller has to make a new tender of goods which conform to the contract. This 
will usually not create major problems where generic goods are the subject matter of the 
contract (e.g. oil, sugar, grain).”).
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fundamental breach?115 Unlike article 46(3) concerning repair, article 46(2) 
does not impose a condition of reasonableness or feasibility on substitution. 
And, in many cases, substitution “will cause hardship to the seller. He must 
not only take back the delivered goods but also deliver substitute goods, 
which necessarily involves the risk of damages or loss and expenses such as 
transportation and storage.”116 And the buyer can often more readily procure 
the same goods from another source. In such cases, it may be reasonable for 
the buyer not to require the seller to tender a substitute.
The auxiliary verb “may” seems to imply that in some cases the buyer 
does not have to require substitution and he can avoid the contract. 
However, where the factors which make substitution unreasonable are 
absent, as in the case of fungible goods readily delivered, the principle of 
good faith acts to ensure that the buyer is not allowed to avoid the contract 
but rather obliged to require substitution, by the same rationale explicated 
on repair.
E. Seller’s Right and Obligation to Remedy His Failure and 
Cross-Reference to Article 49
1.  Seller’s Right and Obligation to Remedy His Failure
Now it has been demonstrated that the principle of good faith obliges 
the buyer to require the seller to remedy his failure to perform, if certain 
conditions of reasonableness are met. It is time to establish the seller’s 
obligation to remedy under the same principle. It is better to quote here 
again the full provision of article 48(1):
Subject to article 49, the seller may, even after the date for 
delivery, remedy at his own expense any failure to perform his 
obligations, if he can do so without unreasonable delay and without 
causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or uncertainty of 
reimbursement by the seller of expenses advanced by the buyer. 
However, the buyer retains any right to claim damages as provided 
for in this Convention.117
115. A separate problem is whether buyers can correctly judge the fundamentality of a 
breach. See Michael Will, Article 46, in VIENNA COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at 337 (“The 
buyer had to decide whether there was a breach of contract, and assume the risk of a wrong 
decision on that point. Under Article 46(2) of the Convention he has a second decision to 
make, namely whether the breach is a fundamental one. The risk of error on this second 
decision is much greater because the question is more subtle.”). As we will discuss in Part 
VII, this uncertainty may be resolved when both parties collaborate to cure.
116. Koch, supra note 14, at 332.
117. CISG, supra note 1, art. 48(1) (emphasis added).
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Let us put aside for a moment the cross-reference, “Subject to article 
49,” because it involves a daunting problem and has been a target of 
controversy among commentators and scholars.
Focus instead on the fact that, here again, the seller may remedy his 
own failure to perform. The auxiliary verb “may” continues to connote that 
the seller does not have to take this action if he does not want to. If he 
decides not to remedy, the buyer will have the opportunity to avoid the 
contract. However, the seller is not acting in a vacuum. Recall that applying 
the good faith principle in our interpretation of articles 46(2)–(3), the buyer 
is obliged to require the seller to remedy if all the conditions of a reasonable 
and feasible remedy are met. Similar factors restrict when the seller may 
remedy under article 48(1), limiting seller’s opportunity to remedy to 
situations where “he can do so without unreasonable delay and without 
causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or uncertainty of 
reimbursement by the seller of expenses advanced by the buyer.” But just as 
under article 46, if the requirements of reasonableness on both parties are 
fulfilled, the seller’s rejection of the opportunity to remedy will manifestly 
show his lack of honesty of intention or sincerity in professions. Applying 
the principle of good faith, the seller will be driven into a tight corner where 
he is obliged to remedy.
2. Cross-Reference to Article 49
Here, we come back to what we have put aside (specifically, the 
formidable cross-reference “Subject to article 49”), as it is relevant to much 
of what we have discussed above. At the Diplomatic Conference in Vienna 
in 1980, the cross-reference replaced the clause, “Unless the buyer has 
declared the contract avoided.”118 Professor Honnold explains:
[The] “[u]nless” clause might be construed to authorize avoidance 
of the contract that would frustrate the seller’s right to cure. There
was widespread agreement that whether a breach is fundamental 
should be decided in the light of the seller’s offer to cure . . . and 
that the buyer’s right to avoid the contract (Art. 49(1)) should not 
nullify the seller’s right to cure (Art.48(1)). However, it was 
difficult to find language that would clearly express the proper 
relationship between avoidance and cure. Finally, the Conference 
adopted a joint proposal prepared by delegates who had been 
anxious to protect the seller’s right to cure. Under this proposal, the 
“Unless . . .” clause of the 1978 Draft was deleted and replaced by 
the present cross-reference to Article 49.119
If article 48(1) had retained the clause, it would be clearer that the 
buyer’s right to avoid trumps the seller’s right to cure. Instead, the drafters’ 
118. See HONNOLD, supra note 18, at 686-87.
119. See HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 426.
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replacement with the cross-reference to article 49 implies that there are 
cases where the buyer’s right to avoid must give way to the seller’s right to 
cure.
Professor Will explains the still-unsettled problem:
The condition of non-avoidance raises the fundamental issue of 
whether avoidance or cure should prevail. This question cannot be 
answered with certainty, since the words “subject to Article 49” are 
no clearer than the former “unless” clause which they replaced. The 
relationship between article[s] 48 and 49 remains unsettled. Here 
the interests of buyers and sellers clash so strongly that it seems 
almost impossible to find a proper balance. In fact, the issue has 
long been one of the most controversial in international sales law.120
As explicated in Section A of this part, courts “have frequently held that 
a curable defect of the goods does not in itself amount to a fundamental 
breach, if there is the possibility that the seller may cure,”121 and most 
commentators agree. On the other hand, if we read the cross-reference 
literally and
[give] these words their ordinary and plain meaning, it appears that 
the buyer’s right to declare the contract avoided in accordance with 
article 49(1)(a) prevails over the seller’s right to cure. The 
determination of fundamental breach in the light of any offer to 
cure, however, would enable the seller to prevent the buyer from 
avoiding the contract and would, therefore, actually allow the 
seller’s right to cure to prevail over the buyer’s right to avoid.122
The disparity of these two opposing views seems to lie in the difference 
in the time during which a fundamental breach is identified. While the 
former view grants a grace period for attempts to cure, the latter seems to 
envision an avoidance declared immediately after the delivery or inspection 
reveals defects, denying any grace period. The shortcoming of the literal 
view is that it freezes the state of the defective goods as it is at delivery, 
excluding any possibility of cure. However, even a defective machine that 
does not turn on may be easily and quickly repaired by a replacement of 
simple parts, just as a decayed crop may be readily substituted with a 
wholesome one. The latter view fails to rationalize its blatant disregard of 
this possibility—and of the drafting history which changed the “unless” 
clause to a cross-reference.
Here, it would be best for us to appreciate what article 49 says. It says, 
“The buyer may declare the contract avoided,” if non-conformity of goods 
amounts to a fundamental breach. It does not say, “The buyer may avoid the 
120. Michael Will, Article 48, in VIENNA COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at 349.
121. Schroeter, supra note 12, at 445, ¶47. 
122. Koch, supra note 14, at 323.
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contract.” Why does it bother to say the buyer may declare?  One possible 
interpretation is that the buyer cannot by himself conclusively determine 
whether a breach qualifies as fundamental, i.e., whether the breach 
substantially deprives him of his legitimate expectations. To make an 
objective determination of fundamentality is very difficult, even for courts 
and scholars. The buyer’s assessment may well be subjective and arbitrary: 
What appears to be a fundamental breach for the buyer may be curable by 
the seller, and hence the seller can turn it into a non-fundamental breach. 
The buyer may also change his judgement regarding the fundamentality of 
the breach in a remedial negotiation with the seller. Article 49(1) implies to 
the buyer, “You may regard the breach as fundamental and declare the 
contract avoided, but it may turn out to be curable afterward.” Ultimately, it 
is a court that makes the final call.123
Thus, the CISG leaves the initial judgement of fundamentality of breach 
to the declaring party, and that judgement may later be corrected. This 
interpretation also applies to article 46(2), which says, “If the goods do not 
conform with the contract, the buyer may require delivery of substitute 
goods only if the lack of conformity constitutes a fundamental breach of 
contract.”124 In the absence of this interpretation, it may seem “paradoxical 
that the buyer’s right to require delivery of substitute goods is available only 
if there has been a fundamental breach of contract, [when] the fundamental 
nature of the breach exists only if the defect has not been remedied by the 
seller under Article 48 by delivery of substitute goods.”125
This paradox is resolved by an interpretation that the first assessment of 
fundamentality is made by the buyer, and that his assessment of 
fundamentality of breach can be rebutted by the seller’s capability and 
willingness to tender a substitute. Even if the defect is so serious as not to 
allow for repair, but the seller can and does replace the defective goods with 
sound goods, the breach ceases to be fundamental. If the seller is unable to 
tender a substitute or to repair, the breach remains fundamental, and 
therefore the buyer can avoid the contract. Under the theory by this author, 
the buyer has an obligation to require the seller to cure and the seller has an 
obligation to offer to cure.
As we will see in the next part, the buyer and the seller must make 
collaborative efforts to cure defects. The CISG grants a grace period to the 
final determination of fundamentality of breach. During the period, the 
123. If the buyer has wrongfully declared the contract avoided and quit performance, he 
himself may be held liable for a fundamental breach. For a U.S. domestic case illustrating this 
issue, see Walker & Co. v. Harrison, 81 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Mich. 1957) (“But the injured 
party’s determination that there has been a material breach, justifying his own repudiation, is 
fraught with peril, for should such determination, as viewed by a later court in the calm of its 
contemplation, be unwarranted, the repudiator himself will have been guilty of material 
breach and himself have become the aggressor, not an innocent victim.”).
124. CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(2) (emphasis added).
125. Markus Müller-Chen, Article 46, in SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12,
at 746, ¶ 28.
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buyer and the seller collaborate to make a final assessment of the curability 
of the defect: If it is cured, there is not a fundamental breach, and if it is not, 
there remains a fundamental breach and the buyer can avoid the contract. 
Under this interpretation, the cross-reference does not mean that the buyer 
can avoid the contract even though the defect can reasonably be cured. It is 
a confirmatory reference, meaning the buyer retains the right to avoid the 
contract if reasonable efforts to cure have turned out to be a failure.
VII.  Collaborative Efforts to Cure Defects by the 
Seller and the Buyer: Make Them Draw a Line
Some commentators argue for the existence of a general principle of 
cooperation between parties in the CISG.126 In the same vein, the present 
author advocates that there exists a principle of collaboration to cure 
between the parties in the CISG. In this author’s interpretation of articles 
7(1)(2), 25, 46 (2)(3) and 48(1), the seller is obliged to offer to cure, and the 
buyer is obliged to require the seller to cure, non-conformity of the goods if 
the conditions of reasonableness are met. The logical conclusion of this 
interpretation is that the seller and the buyer should, in collaboration, 
attempt to remedy non-conformity. “A policy that permits cure of breach 
and generally fosters further dealing between the contracting parties after 
contract breakdown, and which leaves the injured party whole, is . . .
desirable.”127 Such policies, like my own, will obviate substantial detriment 
and save waste. Therefore, they represent rational economic behavior.
Naturally, and as noted in articles 38128 and 39,129 it is the buyer that first 
discovers non-conformity and informs the seller of it. Then, the seller, who 
is more likely to have knowledge about the goods and their defects, will 
usually advise the buyer about the nature of the defects. They will discuss 
and negotiate how to deal with the problem. Feasibility of cure is a question 
which entails diverse factors and forecasts, such as the degree of difficulty 
of substitution and repair, probability of success, time needed, cost involved 
126. See NEUMANN, supra note 105, at 110 (“The principle of cooperation between the 
parties exists in the Convention and is expressed in many provisions.”). Professor Neumann 
argues that the principle of cooperation is embodied in (among others) the rules of 
communication of information provided in Articles 39(1), 48(2), 65, and so on. See id. at 110–
16.
127. Robert A. Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together After Material Breach–Common 
Law Mitigation Rules, the UCC, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U. COLO. L.
REV. 553, 555 (1976).
128. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 38 (providing in part: “(1) The buyer must examine the 
goods, or cause them to be examined, within as short a period as is practicable in the 
circumstances.”).
129. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 39 (providing in part: “(1) The buyer loses the right to 
rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does not give notice to the seller specifying the 
nature of the lack of conformity within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to 
have discovered it.”).
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and so forth. These forecasts normally belong in the domain of the seller’s 
expertise, and therefore it is up to the seller to make an initial decision. The 
buyer may make his own decision in response, taking account of the time 
and expense necessary for cure, the possibility of alternative deals, and so 
forth.
The scope of this collaboration is not totally autonomous, but, as noted 
above, is bounded by the explicit conditions imposed by relevant articles of 
the CISG. These conditions are important in that they infuse reasonableness 
and objectivity into the parties’ solution. The condition imposed on the 
buyer’s right to request repair in article 46(3) is “unless this is unreasonable 
having regard to all the circumstances.” The three conditions on the seller’s 
right to attempt remedy in article 48(1) are “without unreasonable delay, 
unreasonable inconvenience, and uncertainty of reimbursement.”130 When 
the seller and buyer interact, the two sets of conditions are jointly imposed 
on their cooperation. (The buyer’s condition, i.e., the absence of 
unreasonableness, has catch-all characteristics which can embrace the three 
conditions imposed on the seller’s offer to remedy.)
Professor Honnold cogently illustrates the steps which sensible 
merchants would take to cure a defect of goods:
Let us suppose that . . . on June 1, shortly after arrival of the goods, 
Buyer emailed: “Machine does not operate[,] apparently because of 
a defect in Part X. Will you remedy the defect? Must have machine 
in working order by June 20 or will be forced to avoid contract and 
obtain machine elsewhere. Need to know by June 10 what you plan 
to do with respect to arrival of your engineer and plans for repair.”
Such a message would respond to the parties’ normal commercial 
interests to maintain a productive business relationship. . . . This 
advanced stage of the relationship between the parties, with the 
buyer in possession of defective goods shipped by the seller, leads 
to the conclusion that the seller also has the “obligation” to respond 
to the buyer’s request for early information regarding the seller’s 
plans concerning cure. . . . When cure of a defect is feasible[,] the 
seller will be anxious to effect the cure to preserve good business 
relationships and also to minimize the loss resulting from 
avoidance of the contract. The point . . . is to suggest that the buyer 
need not be consumed by doubt over whether the seller will cure 
the defect; a simple inquiry will provide the answer.131
130. For detailed explication about these conditions, see generally Peter Huber, Article 
48, in UN COMMENTARY supra note 16, at 698.
131. HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 427–28, art. 48, § 296; see also Markus Müller-Chen,
Article 48, in SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12, at 769, ¶ 16 (“[I]t must be 
pointed out that the dogmatic difficulties in the relationship between the seller’s right to 
remedy by subsequent performance and the buyer’s right to avoid the contract occur primarily 
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In answering the buyer’s inquiry, the seller may sometimes provide a 
reasonable assurance to the buyer that cure is feasible132 and may make a 
price-reduction agreement. Thus, the feasibility of cure is the watershed 
which divides a non-fundamental breach and a fundamental one. If cure is 
feasible and a collaborative, good faith attempt to remedy has succeeded, 
there exists no fundamental breach. If the seller refuses to cure for no valid 
reason or is indolent in attempting to cure, the defect amounts to a 
fundamental breach, and the buyer can declare the contract avoided. 
Likewise, if a cure is not feasible or sincere attempts to cure have turned out 
to be fruitless, then the breach is qualified as fundamental, substantially 
depriving the buyer of his legitimate expectations. If the buyer refuses 
seller’s sincere offer to cure when cure is feasible, the breach is not 
qualified as fundamental, and if the buyer declared the contract avoided, he 
himself may be liable for a fundamental breach. Although these results 
might be unforeseeable at the time of conclusion of the contract (preventing 
the contract from being avoided according to the foreseeability test), non-
avoidance in this situation adds insult to injury: At the time the contract is 
concluded, reasonable merchants will have a tacit assumption that some of 
the goods they deal in will need to be repaired and that attempts to repair 
may sometimes fail.
In practice, this aligns with how courts treat failed attempts to cure. The 
Swiss Packaging Machine Case is illustrative.133 In that case, involving a 
seriously defective packaging machine, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court 
held:
The packaging machine delivered by [Seller] only achieved 29% of 
the agreed performance. Given a loss of productivity of 71%, 
[Buyer] is substantially deprived of what it has been entitled to 
expect under the contract. This amounts to a fundamental breach. 
The numerous attempts by [Seller] to cure the lack of conformity 
also demonstrate that the non-conformity could not be remedied 
within a reasonable time. Moreover, the particular packaging 
machine was specifically designed for [Buyer]’s individual needs. 
Therefore, any resale of the machine has been impossible or at least 
inappropriate for [Buyer].134
when the parties do not sufficiently communicate and cooperate with each other.”). Or when a 
party acts for an opportunistic reason.
132. In this article, the word “feasible” is used to mean “practicable, meeting all the 
conditions of reasonableness.”
133. See Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court], 18 May 2009, 4A_68/2009, 
translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090518s1.html (last updated May 7, 
2010) (Switz.) (Packaging Machine Case).
134. Id.  
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The Italy Plastic Bag Recycling Machine Case is also illustrative.135
From the very beginning, a machine for recycling plastic bags failed to 
function properly. The fact that the machine never functioned at the optimal 
levels it reached during testing was central to the case’s disposition. An 
Italian District Court held:
It is indeed indisputably shown that even after the interventions and 
repairs conducted by [Seller], the machine was far away from 
achieving the promised production capacity. In fact, it has been 
proven that the interruptions of the production cycle continued. So 
did the replacements, repairs, maintenance, increased power 
consumption and low production level, which resulted in economic 
inefficiency of the production.136
The U.S. Compressors for Air-Conditioners Case,137 which is analyzed 
in Section A of Part IV, is also illustrative. “[S]everal unsuccessful attempts 
to cure the defect in the compressors” were made before the buyer declared 
the contract avoided.138 In all of the above cases, the courts found a 
fundamental breach. Probably, it was relatively easy for them to do so, with 
the failure of genuine endeavors to repair the machines likely convincing 
the judges that the lingering breaches amounted to fundamental ones.
This understanding of fundamentality also aligns with cases where 
judges have denied avoidance, inferring that the reasonable efforts of a party 
would have cured the defects. The Switzerland Inflatable Triumphal Arch 
Case is demonstrative.139 The buyer obtained from the seller three inflatable 
triumphal arches, which were set beside a car racing circuit for 
advertisement. On the first day of the race, one of them collapsed. The race 
management official took down all the arches. Subsequently, the buyer 
informed the seller of the defects, and some two weeks later declared the 
contract avoided. The court denied a fundamental breach, stating that if a 
remedy had been carried out after the first use, the arches could have been 
used during later races.
Thus, by applying the principle of good faith, parties, courts, and 
scholars are relieved from the futile inquiry of how substantial a substantial 
detriment must be in order to pass the muster of article 25, qualifying as a 
fundamental breach. Instead, let the parties draw a line in the sand of 
substantiality for themselves. They are usually the most acquainted with the 
135. See Trib. di Busto Arsizio, 13 Dicembre 2001, n.1192, translation available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/011213i3.html (last updated November 26, 2012) (It.) 
(Machinery Case).
136. Id.
137. 71 F.3d 1024, supra note 46.
138. Id. at 1027.
139. Handelsgericht Aargau [HG] [Commercial Court], Nov. 5, 2002, OR.2001.00029, 
translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021105s1.html (last updated Dec. 9, 
2009) (Switz.) (Inflatable Triumphal Arch Case).
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peculiar characteristics of their own problems. It is better to make them 
formulate a remedy of their own, one best suited to their unique situation. 
But in cases where remedial measures have not been taken when they seem 
to have been possible, it is for a judge to decide the feasibility of remedy, 
with the help of the parties and experts.
VIII.  Conclusion
Presently, courts and tribunals have difficulty applying article 25. The 
actual situation is aptly described:
Several factual and abstract circumstances must be considered 
before the interpreter can say that a fundamental breach did occur. 
As a result, it may become difficult to respond to the basic question 
[of] whether a contract is avoidable or not in a particular situation, 
without submitting the case to a court of law or to an arbitral 
tribunal.140
Fortunately, in our long quest for a sensible interpretation of article 25, 
we have found a solution: determining the existence of a fundamental 
breach based on the success of the parties’ (now mandatory) good faith 
efforts to remedy the non-compliance of goods. The verdict they reach after 
deliberations and trials will work as a sorting mechanism to distinguish 
fundamental breaches from non-fundamental ones. This test saves us an 
otiose quest for a definition of “fundamental” using “substantial”—which, 
as we have discussed, is at best a “playful tautology.”141
Still, the final answer will be made by a court. This is implied in the 
letters of article 49(1), providing, “The buyer may declare the contract 
avoided.”142 This tells the buyer, “You may declare if you wish, but a court 
may hold otherwise if the seller could have remedied the non-compliance.” 
Thus, the CISG leaves the initial judgement of fundamentality of breach to 
the declaring party, to be checked by both counterparty and court.143 This 
article has advocated that the initial (subjective) judgement of 
fundamentality of breach should be scrutinized by the collaborative, bona 
fide efforts of both parties to cure the defects. If the defects have been 
cured, there is no fundamental breach, and if they have not be cured, there 
remains a fundamental breach and the buyer can avoid the contract.
140. Grebler, supra note 56, at 409.
141. Michael Will, Article 25, in VIENNA COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at 211. 
142. CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(1) (emphasis added).
143. See U.N. Secretariat, Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, at 41, art. 45 (now art. 49), commentary ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.97/19 (1980) (“Under article [49] of this Convention the contract is still in force unless 
the buyer has affirmatively declared it avoided. Of course, uncertainty may still exist as to 
whether the conditions had been met authorizing the buyer to declare the contract avoided.”).  
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This author sincerely hopes this article will save parties from going to 
court, which may compel far more time, cost, and inconvenience than 
making another transaction for sound goods with another seller from 
scratch. Hopefully, this article will also save time for judges who might 
agonize in searching for a universal criterion of substantial detriment in 
vain. While scholars have time to muse, judges and lawyers usually do not, 
and merchants even less.144
144. See Michael Will, Article 25, in VIENNA COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at 208 (“But 
while philosophers have time to muse, lawyers usually have not; and merchants even less.”).
